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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 17, 2015, John Hendricks was faced with a choice: fight or flight. 1 Taking
a break between fares while working as an Uber driver, he found himself in a life-or-death
situation.2 He heard a man, later identified as Everardo Custodio, yell to a group of
pedestrians.3 Hendricks then watched as Custodio produced a gun and began firing at the
group.4 In imminent danger himself, Hendricks realized that his only means of potential
HVFDSHZDVWRGULYHWKURXJK&XVWRGLR¶VJXQILUH 5 Therefore, Hendricks, a concealed-carry
permit holder, drew his handgun and shot Custodio. 6 $VDUHVXOWRI+HQGULFNV¶VDFWLRQV
Custodio was the only party LQMXUHG LQ WKH LQFLGHQW DOWKRXJK +HQGULFNV¶V YHKLFOH ZDV
struck by a bullet Custodio fired.7 -RKQ+HQGULFNV¶V KDUURZLQJRUGHDORQWKH VWUHHWVRI
Chicago provides a useful illustration of the polarizing issue of the public-carry of
handguns in the United 6WDWHV9LHZHGIURPDVRFLDOVWDQGSRLQWVRPHEHOLHYH+HQGULFNV¶V
best course of action was the one he took²using his firearm to defend himself and other
innocent bystanders. On the other hand, some would argue that Hendricks should have
refrained because Custodio had not shot anyone and might have stopped firing before
anyone was hit. Whether Hendricks is properly characterized as a hero, an ordinary citizen
exercising his right to self-defense, or an outdated throwback clinging to his guns depends
on whom \RXDVN2QHFHUWDLQW\LVWKDWLI+HQGULFNV¶VVWRU\KDGXQIROGHGEHIRUH,OOLQRLV
joined the vast majority of states and became a shall-issue regime, the outcome likely
would have been different and the death toll higher.
A shall-issue state is one in which public-carry permits are issued to all applicants
so long as certain baseline requirements are satisfied. 8 Usually, these requirements are
minimal and are met when an applicant proves the absence of both criminal history and
significant mental health concerns.9 On the other hand, a may-issue state is a regime that
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1. See generally Geoff Ziezulewicz, Concealed Carry Shootings Now Part of Chicago’s Gun Reality, CHI.
TRIB. (Nov. 20, 2015, 12:12 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-concealed-carry-shooting-interviewmet-20151120-story.html; Adam Bates, An Uber Driver With a Concealed Handgun Prevented a Mass Shooting
in Chicago, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 21, 2015, 11:38 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/uber-driver-withconcealed-handgun-prevents-mass-shooting-in-chicago-2015-4.
2. Id.
3. Ziezulewicz, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.; Bates, supra note 1.
8. See Nicholas J. Johnson, Lawful Gun Carriers (Police and Armed Citizens): License, Escalation, and
Race, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 209, 231 n.3 (2017); John R. Lott Jr., What a Balancing Test Will Show for
Right-to-Carry Laws, 71 MD. L. REV. 1205, 1207 (2012); Aaron Morrison, Where is it Legal to Carry a Gun?
List of States with Concealed-Carry Laws, MIC (July 20, 2016), https://mic.com/articles/149325/where-is-itlegal-to-carry-a-gun-list-of-states-with-concealed-carry-laws#.ggQtnJ6TY; DANIEL W. WEBSTER, CONCEALED
CARRY OF FIREARMS: FACTS VS. FICTION 2 (Nov. 16, 2017) https://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-andinstitutes/johns-hopkins-center-for-gun-policy-and-research/publications/concealed-carry-of-firearms.pdf
(providing a map of shall-issue versus may-issue states).
9. See, e.g., Handgun Licensing FAQ, OKLA. ST. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://osbi.ok.gov/handgunlicensing/faq (last visited Nov. 13, 2018); Eligibility Requirements for a Florida Concealed Weapon License,
FLA. DEP¶T AGRIC. & CONSUMER SERVS., https://www.freshfromflorida.com/Consumer-Resources/Concealed-
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often restricts public-carry to those applicants who demonstrate some specific, enhanced
need for self-defense.10
,WLVLPSRUWDQWWREHDULQPLQGWKURXJKRXWWKLV1RWHWKDW-RKQ+HQGULFNV¶VODZIXO
shooting does not exist in isolation. For example, in 2018, a lawfully armed person in
Florida shot and wounded a gunman who fired multiple rounds in a crowded park at a
back-to-VFKRROHYHQWDQGLQDODZIXOO\DUPHGFLWL]HQGXEEHGD³*RRG6DPDULWDQ´
killed an active shooter at a sports bar in Texas.11
Shooting events like these keep the controversy over public-carry squarely at the
forefront of the national conscience. Simultaneously, courts are struggling to determine
the extent and the nature of public-carry rights. Specifically, courts are endeavoring to
determine whether the right to carry firearms in public is constitutionally guaranteed.
Further, if such a right does exist under the Second Amendment, what type of public-carry
is guaranteed by the Constitution: concealed-carry, where the firearm is hidden from view;
open-FDUU\ZKHUHWKHILUHDUPLVH[SRVHGRUERWK"'HVSLWHWKHDUJXPHQWWKDWWKHQDWLRQ¶V
framers intended the Second Amendment to apply only to the maintenance of the
collective state militias,12 the Supreme Court made it clear in District of Columbia v.
Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago WKDWWKH6HFRQG$PHQGPHQW¶VJXDUDQWHHLVDQ
individual one that is fully applicable to the states and that protects the right to use
handguns for self-defense.13
In Heller and McDonald, the Court focused on handgun possession within the home
and conclusively determined that the in-home possession of handguns is not only a
constitutionally guaranteed right, but also a fundamental one.14 But what happens when a
gun owner chooses to carry a firearm beyond the home? Circuits are split over the extent
to which Heller extends to public settings. The judicial tension seems to stem from the
varying definitions courts are giving to the core of the Second Amendment because, since
Heller, PRVWFRXUWVKDYHDVVXPHGWKDWDVWDWXWHWKDWLPSOLFDWHVWKH$PHQGPHQW¶VFRUHPXVW
be subjected to a higher standard of judicial scrutiny than a statute that does not. 15
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Weapon-License/Applying-for-a-Concealed-Weapon-License/Eligibility-Requirements (last visited Nov. 13,
2018).
10. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. PUB. SAFETY § 5-306(a)(6)(ii); HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-9(a); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:58-4(c); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140 § 131; see also Lott, supra note 8, at 1208; Morrison, supra note
8.
11. Travis Fedschun, Florida Armed Bystander Stops Gunman at Crowded Back-to-School Event at Park,
Police Say, FOX NEWS (Aug. 6, 2018), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2018/08/06/florida-armed-bystander-stopsgunman-at-crowded-back-to-school-event-at-park-police-say.html; Phil McCausland, ‘Good Samaritan’ Kills
Active Shooter in Texas Sports Bar: Police, NBC NEWS (May 4, 2017, 8:40 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/good-samaritan-kills-active-shooter-texas-sports-bar-police-n755136.
12. PATRICK J. CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF GUN RIGHTS FROM COLONIAL MILITIAS TO
CONCEALED CARRY 104 (2018); see also Saul Cornell, St. George Tucker and the Second Amendment: Original
Understandings and Modern Misunderstandings, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1123, 1124±25, 1130 (2006); Richard
Aborn & Marlene Koury, Toward a Future, Wiser Court: A Blueprint for Overturning District of Columbia v.
Heller, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1353, 1360±62 (2012).
13. See generally District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561
U.S. 742 (2010).
14. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628±29; McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767, 791.
15. E.g., Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013) (³[W]e assume that any law that would
burden the µfundamental,¶ core right of self-defense in the home by a law-abiding citizen would be subject to
strict scrutiny. But, as we move outside the home, firearm rights have always been more limited, because public
safety interests often outweigh individual interests in self-defense.´) (quoting United States v. Masciandaro, 638
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As a starting point, Heller defined the core purpose of the Second Amendment as
the right to use handguns for self-defense.16 Absent from this definition is the answer to a
crucial question, the question on which this Note will focus: is the core limited to certain
locations? Stated more directly, is it limited to the home? As the recent cases of Wrenn v.
District of Columbia and Young v. Hawaii illustrate, by expanding or contracting the
6HFRQG $PHQGPHQW¶V FRUH FRXUWV JLYH WKHPVHOYHV VLJQLILFDQW OHHZD\ WR GHWHUPLQH
whether a statute that limits firearm possession outside the home is constitutional.17 Such
limiting statutes²commonly referred to as good-cause statutes²often restrict the right to
carry handguns in public to a sub-set of law-abiding citizens who are capable of
articulating some heightened need of self-defense.18 As will be dissected below, Heller¶V
discussion of public-carry was ambiguous. However, as interpreted by some lower courts,
Heller¶V language supports the inference that the right to self-defense does reach beyond
the home and may sit at the core of the Second Amendment.19 If the Supreme Court were
to reach a decisive conclusion on the matter, the public safety implications could be
extensive.
Part I of this Note explores the background of the Second Amendment by
highlighting the role of the militia during the American Revolution. This section illustrates
the public admiration of the militia during the colonial period as well as the shared public
IHDURIWKHPLOLWLD¶VDQWLWKHVLVDVWDQGLQJPLOLWDU\ 20 As discussed in other writings, there
is an argument that the founders did not envision the Second Amendment as a protection
of individual firearm rights unrelated to state militias but, rather, intended it to provide a

09/18/2019 11:37:45
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F.3d 458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011)); Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 670±71 (1st Cir. 2018) (³In our judgment, the
appropriate level of scrutiny must turn on how closely a particular law or policy approaches the core of the
Second Amendment right and how heavily it burdens that right. A law or policy that burdens conduct falling
within the core of the Second Amendment requires a correspondingly strict level of scrutiny, whereas a law or
policy that burdens conduct falling outside the core of the Second Amendment logically requires a less
demanding level of scrutiny.´); Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 93 (2d Cir. 2012) (³We do
not believe however, that heightened scrutiny must always be akin to strict scrutiny when a law burdens the
Second Amendment . . . . Although we have no occasion to decide what level of scrutiny should apply to laws
that burden the µcore¶ Second Amendment protection identified in Heller, we believe that applying less than strict
scrutiny when the regulation does not burden the µcore¶ protection of self-defense in the home makes eminent
sense . . . ´); see also Sam Zuidema, Raising Heller: Constitutional Scrutiny in a New Age of Second Amendment
Rights, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 813, 826 (2018) (³Most courts have determined that the core is afforded more
protection than rights falling within the amendment¶s periphery.´).
16. Heller, 554 U.S. at 630.
17. See 864 F.3d 650, 661, 667 (D.C. Cir. 2017); 896 F.3d 1044, 1070±71 (9th Cir. 2018).
18. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. PUB. SAFETY § 5-306(a)(6)(ii); HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-9(a); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:58-4(c); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140 § 131; see also Joseph Blocher, Good Cause Requirements for
Carrying Guns in Public, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 218, 218 (2014) (³[S]ome jurisdictions . . . require applicants for
. . . public carrying licenses to show cause (such as Maryland¶s µgood and substantial reason¶ or New York¶s
µspecial need for self-protection¶) for public carrying . . . ´).
19. Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 657±58 (discussing their opinion that public-carry lies and the core of the Second
Amendment and stating that in Heller, the Supreme Court gave ³seemingly equal treatment to the right to µkeep¶
and to µbear,¶ first defining those µphrases¶ and then teasing out their implications. In that long preliminary
analysis, the Court elaborates that to µbear¶ means to µwear, bear, or carry . . . upon the person . . . in a case of
conflict with another person. That definition shows that the Amendment¶s core must span . . . the µright to possess
and carry weapons in case of confrontation.¶´) (citations omitted); Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935±36
(7th Cir. 2012) (³Heller repeatedly invokes a broader Second Amendment right than the right to have a gun in
one¶s home . . . ´).
20. CHARLES, supra note 12, at 104; Nelson Lund, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms in the Roberts Court,
2±3 SSRN, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3038923 (last revised Apr. 5, 2018).
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21. CHARLES, supra note 12, at 104; see also Cornell, supra note 12, at 1124±25, 1130; Aborn & Koury,
supra note 12, at 1360±62.
22. Blocher, supra note 18, at 218.
23. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant in Opposition of Rehearing En Banc at 12 n.8, Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d
1044
(9th
Cir.
2018)
(No.
12-17808)
[hereinafter
Brief
of
Plaintiff-Appellant],
https://www.ar15.com/forums/general/Response-to-En-Banc-Petition-in-Young-v-State-of-Hawaii-filed/52163534/ (stating, ³[t]o be sure, there is conflict between the holding in Wrenn that a µgood cause¶ requirement
is facially unconstitutional, and the holdings in Gould, Woollard, Kachalsky and Drake, that a µgood cause¶
requirement facially comports with the Second Amendment´).
24. 896 F.3d at 1070.
25. Order Granting En Banc Rehearing, 915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019).
26. Order Staying En Banc Rehearing, No. 12-17808 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2019) (D.C. No. 1:12-cv-0036-HGBMK); New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass¶n v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2018).
27. Supreme Court of the United States Granted & Noted List October Term 2019 Cases for Argument,
SUPREME COURT U.S. (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/19grantednotedlist.pdf.
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balance against the federal military by granting citizens the right to keep and bear arms in
the limited context of militia service.21
3DUW,,DQDO\]HVWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQVLQHeller and McDonald. While these
decisions relied heavily on a historical interpretation of the Second Amendment, in both
instances, the Court expanded the reach of the widely-believed intent of the framers and
held that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess handguns for selfdefense even in the absence of any militia connection.
Part III discusses the hotly contested right of public-carry by examining and defining
good-cause statutes. As previously noted, such statutes often deny public-carry permits to
law-abiding citizens with no mental health concerns unless the applicant is able to establish
cause for self-defense over and above the self-protection needs of the general public.22
This portion of the Note also analyzes the public-carry circuit split in light of the recent
Wrenn and Young decisions, and more specifically, exposes the shifting core of the Second
Amendment. While Wrenn created the split,23 Young introduced a third interpretation of
WKHFRUHWKXVUHYHDOLQJWKHFRUH¶VPDOOHDEOHQDWXUH 24
Importantly, by order issued on February 8, 2019, the Ninth Circuit has voted to
rehear Young v. Hawaii en banc.25 However, the date of the rehearing is uncertain because
on February 14, 2019, the Ninth Circuit issued an order staying the en banc proceeding
SHQGLQJWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VUXOLQJLQNew York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New
York (a Second Circuit case focused on the constitutionality of a New York City handgun
licensing scheme that restricts the circumstances under which a licensed firearm can
legally be transported from a licensed premises).26 The Supreme Court is scheduled to
hear New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York during its October 2019
term.27
Regardless of whether courts are reshaping the core as a result of uncertainty or in
an effort to achieve a desired result, the effect of such expansion or contraction of the core
LVVLJQLILFDQWEHFDXVHDFRXUW¶Vdefinition of the core often determines the level of scrutiny
that it applies to test the constitutionality of a challenged good-cause statute. Finally, this
section of the Note discusses two potential flaws in the Young ruling, namely the Ninth
&LUFXLW¶Vfailure to rule decisively on the constitutionality of good-cause statutes and the
FRXUW¶VRYHU-application of history during its analysis of the Second Amendment.
3DUW ,9 UDLVHV WKH SRLQW WKDW WKH MXGLFLDO IRFXV RQ WKH 6HFRQG $PHQGPHQW¶V FRUH
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appears to have grown since Heller. Given the current spotlight on the core, this Part
argues that the concept of the core is possibly being rendered unnecessarily abstract as a
UHVXOWRIWKHUHOHYDQWFDVHODZ¶VIDLOXUHWRH[SODLQZKDWH[DFWO\LWPHDQVIRUWKH6HFRQG
Amendment to have a core in the first place. This portion of the Note suggests, based on
language and inferences drawn from Heller and McDonald, WKDWWKH6HFRQG$PHQGPHQW¶V
FRUHLVSURSHUO\GHILQHGDQGXQGHUVWRRGVLPSO\DVWKH$PHQGPHQW¶VSULPDU\SXUSRVHIt
WKHQH[DPLQHVZKHWKHUVXFKDVXEVWLWXWLRQRIWHUPVPLJKWKDYHDOWHUHGWKH1LQWK&LUFXLW¶V
ruling in Young.
Given the shifting nature of the core, Part VI concludes by arguing that the
disagreement among the circuits regarding the right to carry handguns in public makes
6XSUHPH&RXUWLQWHUYHQWLRQERWKQHFHVVDU\DQGDSSURSULDWH,Q$PHULFD¶VPDVV-shooting
society, the public safety implications of a Supreme Court ruling placing the right of
public-carry either inside or outside of the core of the Second Amendment could be
profound.28
II.

THE ORIGINAL PURPOSE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT:
PRESERVATION OF STATE MILITIAS

To place any dependence upon Militia, is, assuredly, resting upon a broken staff. Men just
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28. I assert that the public safety impact could be profound because, although the majority of states are shallissue states, those states that are may-issue are some of the nation¶s most populous. As a result, a Supreme Court
ruling that placed public carry at the core of the Second Amendment would affect millions of Americans. See
WEBSTER, supra note 8, at 2.
29. Battles of Lexington and Concord, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/americanrevolution/battles-of-lexington-and-concord (last visited Sept. 4, 2018).
30. Id.
31. MICHAEL WALDMAN, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: A BIOGRAPHY 10 (2014).
32. Battles of Lexington and Concord, supra note 29; WALDMAN, supra note 31, at 10.
33. WALDMAN, supra note 31, at 11.
34. Id. at 12±13.
35. Id. at 13±14.
36. Id. at 14.
37. Id.
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The Revolutionary War began on April 19, 1775, with the Battles of Lexington and
Concord.29 These battles were the American response to increasing tension between
%ULWDLQDQGWKHFRORQLHVRYHU%ULWDLQ¶VDWWHPSWWRVHL]HFRORQLDOZHDSRQV 30 At this point
in American history, militias were recognized by some as an established defense system,
as many militia-men had fought in the French and Indian War and were formidable
combatants.31 As a result, when 20,000 colonists intercepted British troops on the
Lexington town square, they forced a retreat.32 In the early days of the war, the colonists
UHYHOHGLQWKHLGHDRI³WKHSHRSOH´ILQDOO\WDNLQJWKHLUVWDQGDJDinst the Crown.33 However,
as the war progressed, national leaders began to doubt whether national security was
sufficiently safe in the hands of the militia system. 34 Shortly after the Revolution began,
&RQJUHVVUHQDPHGWKHPLOLWLDJURXSVWKHQHZ³$PHULFDQ&RQWLQHQWDO$UP\´DQGHOHFWHG
George Washington Commander-in-Chief.35 After joining his troops, Washington found
disarray.36 Desertion was commonplace and leadership was poor.37 In light of his
observations, Washington wrote Congress and said:
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dragged from the tender scenes of domestic life; unaccustomed to the din of arms; totally
unacquainted with every kind of military skill . . . [are] timid and ready to fly from their own
shadows. Besides, the sudden change in their manner of living . . . produces shameful, and
scandalous desertions . . . . Certain I am, that it would be cheaper to keep 50,000 or 100,000
men in constant pay than to depend upon half the number, and supply the other half
occasionally with militia.38

WALDMAN, supra note 31, at 14±15.
Id. at 12±13.
Lund, supra note 20, at 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12±16.
Lund, supra note 20, at 2.
CHARLES, supra note 12, at 104.
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
CHARLES, supra note 12, at 70.
Id. at 100 (quoting founding-era law professor, St. George Tucker).
See id.
WALDMAN, supra note 31, at 43.

C M
Y K

09/18/2019 11:37:45

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
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As Michael Waldman argued in his book The Second Amendment: A Biography,
³:DUV FKDQJH PDQ\ WKLQJV 7KH\ UHRUGHU WKLQNLQJ WHDFK KDUG OHVVRQV MXPEOH VRFLDO
classes. Certainly the American Revolution did that. Among other things, it instantly began
to school its leaders in the limits of the much romanticized militia system and the role of
WKH FLWL]HQ VROGLHU´39 The lessons learned in war were not forgotten during the
Constitutional Convention, and they provided the backdrop that resulted in the granting of
significant power to the federal government to maintain a national military and regulate
the militia.40
A centralization of military power was a concern among the people when the Bill of
Rights was drafted, and the framers were sensitive to the public disquiet. 41 Recognizing
that a standing military was a potential danger to individual liberty, the founders believed
the state militias provided a necessary barrier against oppressive federal power. 42 This was
the mindset that led to the inclusion of the Second Amendment in the Bill of Rights, 43
ZKLFKVLPSO\VWDWHV³$ZHOOUHJXODWHG0LOLWLDEHLQJQHFHVVDU\WRWKHVHFXULW\RIDIUHH
6WDWHWKHULJKWRIWKHSHRSOHWRNHHSDQGEHDU$UPVVKDOOQRWEHLQIULQJHG´ 44
The Founding Fathers viewed the Amendment as a constitutional protection against
a standing military.45 5HJDUGLQJWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ¶VGLYLVLRQRIPLOLWLDSRZHUEHWZHHQVWDWH
DQG IHGHUDO JRYHUQPHQW ³DOO URRP IRU GRXEW RU XQHDVLQHVV XSRQ WKH VXEMHFW´ ZDV
³FRPSOHWHO\UHPRYHG´E\WKH%LOORI5LJKWV¶LQFOXVLRQRIWKH6HFRQG$PHQGPHQW 46 Thus,
the addition of the Amendment was perceived to balance control over the militia in the
SHRSOH¶VIDYRUEHFDXVHLWHQVXUHGWKDWYLDWKHULJKWWRDUPVLQWKHFRQWH[WRIPLOLWLDVHUYice,
the ability of the people to defend their liberty was maintained.47
$EVHQWIURPWKHIRXQGHUV¶LGHDRIDULJKWWRNHHSDQGEHDUDUPVLQPLOLWLDVHUYLFHLV
the notion of the right to do so for the purpose of individual self-defense. During
ratification, which included ardent discussion, writings, and speeches, concerns that the
government would infringe upon individual gun possession rights were infrequently
raised.48 ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV -RKQ +HQGULFNV¶V ULJKW WR SRVVHVV D ILrearm with which to
confront Everardo Custodio did not appear to be one of the founders¶ driving concerns.
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III. THE HELLER EFFECT²DESPITE THE PURPOSE OF ITS CODIFICATION,
THE SECOND AMENDMENT GUARANTEES AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO
KEEP AND BEAR ARMS
'HVSLWHWKHIRXQGHUV¶IRFXVRQWKHPLOLWLD the general understanding of the Second
Amendment changed during the nineteenth century. 49 Increasingly, it became more
associated with individual self-defense and less with militia service.50 Several factors
FRQWULEXWHGWRWKHWUDQVIRUPDWLRQLQFOXGLQJ³Whe decline of the militia, the expansion of
the United States, changes in constitutional drafting, legal commentary and opinions as to
what the Second Amendment and the right to arms afforded, and varying public attitudes
. . . on the ownership . . . of arms . . . ´51 Surprisingly, it took over 200 years from its
ratification for the United States Supreme Court to conduct an in-depth analysis of the
6HFRQG$PHQGPHQW¶VJXDUDQWHH52 That does not mean that the Court has never analyzed
the Amendment, but a review of pre-Heller Supreme Court precedent reveals that no law
regulating firearm possession had ever been declared unconstitutional. 53 Prior to Heller,
the Court viewed the right of individual firearm possession to exist only in the context of
militia service.54 However, in a contentious five to four decision in 2008, Heller changed
the narrative.
Dick Heller was a special police officer who was permitted to possess a handgun
while on duty.55 He attempted to register his weapon to keep it at home as well, but he
was denied due to District of Columbia Code provisions that generally prohibited the
registration of handguns.56 Heller filed suit against the District on Second Amendment
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49. CHARLES, supra note 12, at 122.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (³[T]his case represents this Court¶s first indepth examination of the Second Amendment . . . ´).
53. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 956 (2015); see also
ROOSEVELT THOREAU, THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN A MODERN AMERICA: THE ORIGINAL INTENT OF THE
SECOND AMENDMENT, THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS THAT DEFINE IT, & THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR
ARMS IN A VIOLENT SOCIETY 9±11 (2017); see also, e.g., United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (³In
the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a µshotgun having a barrel of less eighteen
inches in length¶ . . . has some reasonable relationship to the preservation . . . of a well regulated militia, we
cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.´); Miller v.
Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894) (referring to Defendant¶s claim that a Texas statute violated his Second
Amendment rights, the Court concluded ³[w]e have examined the record in vain, however, to find where the
defendant was denied the benefit to any of these provisions, and, even if he were, it is well settled that the
restrictions of these amendments operates only upon the federal power, and have no reference whatever to
proceedings in state courts´); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) (³The second amendment
declares [the right to bear arms for a lawful purpose] shall not be infringed; but this, as has been seen, means no
more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress. This is one of the amendments that has no other effect than
to restrict the powers of the national government, leaving the people to look for their protection against any
violation by their fellow citizens of the rights it recognizes, to . . . the µpowers which related to merely municipal
legislation . . . ¶´); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) (citing favorably the above passage from
Cruikshank).
54. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (stating that possession of the sawed off shotgun in question was not protected
by the Second Amendment because such weapons did not have a reasonable relationship to the preservation of a
well-regulated militia); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 53, at 956.
55. Heller, 554 U.S at 575.
56. Id. at 575.
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57. Id at 575±76.
58. Id. at 599.
59. Id. at 576±77.
60. Heller, 554 U.S. at 577.
61. Id. at 578; see also Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 658 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Heller
and reasoning that ³while preventing Congress from eliminating state militias was the µpurpose that prompted
the [Amendment¶s] codification,¶ that purpose did not limit the right¶s substance, which encompassed the
personal right to armed self-defense´).
62. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628.
63. See id. at 592, 599.
64. Id. at 640±43.
65. Id. at 577.
66. Id. at 630; see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767±68 (2010) (confirming the core
protection guaranteed in Heller); Zuidema, supra note 15, at 826.
67. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628.
68. Id. at 635.
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grounds, seeking to enjoin the city from enforcing the provisions. 57
In the Heller majority opinion, Justice Scalia expressly agreed that the original
SXUSRVHRIWKH$PHQGPHQW¶VLQFOXVLRQLQWKH%LOORI5LJKWVZDVWKHSUHVHUYDWLRQRIWKH
militia.58 The Court then reasoned that the purpose behind the codification of the
Amendment was only part of the story. It highlighted the fact that the Second Amendment
LVV\QWDFWLFDOO\VSOLWLQWRWZR SDUWVDSUHIDWRU\FODXVH ³$ZHOOUHJXODWHG PLOLWLDEHLQJ
QHFHVVDU\WRWKHVHFXULW\RIDIUHH6WDWH´ DQGDQRSHUDWLYHFODXVH ³WKHULJKWRIWKHSHRSOH
to keep and EHDU$UPVVKDOOQRWEHLQIULQJHG´ 59 The Court concluded that the prefatory
clause did not limit the right granted by the operative clause, but simply announced the
reason for its inclusion in the Bill of Rights. 60 This purpose-only view of the prefatory
clause meant that it need not be considered when determining the scope of the right granted
by the Amendment.61 The majority reasoned that the guarantee²³WKHLQKHUHQWULJKWRI
[individual] self-GHIHQVH´62²was revealed in the operative clause which the Court defined
DV³WKHcentral component RIWKHULJKWLWVHOI´63
For some, including the dissent, this interpretation of the effect²or lack of effect²
that the clauses of the Second Amendment have on one another was a dramatic shift in
thinking.64 By disregarding thH SUHIDWRU\ FODXVH LQ GHILQLQJ WKH 6HFRQG $PHQGPHQW¶V
guarantee, the majority expressly acknowledged what it considered to be an appropriate
UHSKUDVLQJ RI WKH $PHQGPHQW ³%HFDXVH D ZHOO UHJXODWHG 0LOLWLD LV QHFHVVDU\ WR WKH
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be
LQIULQJHG´65
After pronouncing that the Second Amendment secures an individual right to
possess handguns for self-defense, the Court drew several conclusions that are currently
proving both central and problematic to the circuits as they struggle to determine
whether²and to what extent²Heller protects an individual firearm possession right
EH\RQG WKH KRPH )LUVW WKH &RXUW QRWHG WKDW ³WKH FRUH ODZIXO SXUSRVH´ RI WKH 6HFRQG
Amendment is the individual right to use operable handguns for self-defense.66 Next, it
observed that the need for self-defense is most acute within the home. 67 Further, and
similarly, the Court opined that the right of law-abiding citizens to use handguns in defense
of their homes is elevated above all other interests.68 Finally, while ruling out rational
basis as a viable option, the Court left open the question of the appropriate level of scrutiny
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to apply to challenged Second Amendment regulations. 69
These pronouncements from Heller raise several issues: if the core of the Second
Amendment is an individual right to keep handguns for self-defense, is that core limited
to the home²the realm in which the need is most acute? Does the fact that the need for
self-defense is most acute in the home mean that, in public settings, the core is not
triggered? Moreover, while the Court made it clear that a ban on handgun possession in
the home would likely fail under any standard of judicial scrutiny, does that necessarily
mean that restrictions on handgun possession in public would survive some appropriate
level of scrutiny? If so, what is the appropriate level?
In 2010, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, two Chicagoans brought an action
FRQWHVWLQJ WKH FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLW\ RI WKH FLW\¶V ILUHDUP ODZV WKDW SUHFOXGHG FLWL]HQV IURP
keeping handguns at home, the Supreme Court revisited the matter and left these questions
unanswered.70 What McDonald did announce was that the Second Amendment guarantee
in Heller, and the unanswered questions presented, are not solely a federal problem.
McDonald reiterated that the individual right of self-defense is the central component of
the Second Amendment,71 DQG E\ YLUWXH RI WKH )RXUWHHQWK $PHQGPHQW¶V GXH SURFHVV
clause, is applicable to the states.72 As a direct result of McDonald, state and local gun
laws were opened to Second Amendment challenges.73
In short, while clearly pronouncing a right to possess handguns at home for selfdefense, Heller and McDonald generated more questions than they answered. As Heller
LWVHOI VWDWHG ³VLQFH WKLV FDVH UHSUHVHQWV WKLV &RXUW¶V ILUVW LQ-depth examination of the
Second Amendment, one should not expect it to clarify the entire field . . . ´74 In no area
is this lack of clarification more apparent than in the arena of the right to bear arms in
public. The quagmire regarding the extension of Heller beyond the home was summarized
by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Masciandaro, when Justice Niemeyer, seemingly
conveying a sense of frustration, stated:

IV. THE SHIFTING CORE: DOES HELLER EXTEND BEYOND THE HOME?
The confusion expressed in Masciandaro is deepened by the fact that Heller and
McDonald noted that, although the right guaranteed by the Second Amendment is
fundamental, it is not absolute.76 As Justice Scalia stated in Heller³QRWKLQJLQRXURSLQLRQ
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69. Id. at 628 n.27.
70. See generally 561 U.S. 742.
71. Id. at 767.
72. Id. at 791.
73. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 53, at 959.
74. 554 U.S. 570 at 635.
75. 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011).
76. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 801±02 (Scalia, J., concurring); Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (³Like most rights, the
right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.´); CHEMERINSKY supra note 53, at 958.
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There may or may not be a Second Amendment right in some places beyond the home, but
we have no idea what those places are, what the criteria for selecting them should be, what
sliding scales of scrutiny might apply to them, or any one of a number of other questions
. . . . The whole matter strikes us as a vast terra incognita that courts should enter only upon
necessity and only then by small degree. 75
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should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms
by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive
places . . . ´77 Recall however, that Heller also seemed to imply that a statute that destroys
the core purpose²or central component²of the Amendment will likely fail under any
level of judicial scrutiny.78 Thus, lower courts currently have two guideposts regarding
the constitutionality of statutes that restrict Second Amendment rights: first, legislatures
ZRXOGEHZLVHWRDYRLGWULIOLQJZLWKWKH$PHQGPHQW¶VFRUHSXUSRVHDQGVHFRQGDQ\WKLQJ
beyond the core purpose may be regulated so long as the regulation withstands the
appropriate level of judicial scrutiny²whatever level that might be.
A. The Constitutionality of Good-Cause Statutes
Good-cause statutes, and their relationship to the core of the Second Amendment,
are at the heart of the public-carry circuit split.79 While such statutory schemes carry
GLIIHUHQWODEHOVVXFKDV³JRRGUHDVRQWRIHDULQMXU\´ 80 ³H[FHSWLRQDOFDVH´81 ³MXVWLILDEOH
QHHG´82 ³JRRGDQGVXEVWDQWLDOUHDVRQ´83 RU³SURSHU-causH´84 they all stand for the idea
that a state retains the authority to deny an individual the privilege to carry a handgun
beyond the home unless the applicant articulates some need for protection greater than the
need of the general public.85
In such jurisdictions, concerns which commonly lead to a desire to be armed, like
working or residing in high-crime areas, are insufficient justifications. 86 By their very
design, good-cause statutes limit the public-carry rights of law-abiding citizens. These
statutes seek the promotion of public safety through the theory that fewer guns equate to a
decrease in public safety risks.87 As the theory goes, allowing people with vague safety
concerns to carry firearms outside the home increases the danger to the public because
armed persons will expose the public to risk if they choose to use their weapons. 88 It is
important to note that while may-issue states that enforce good-cause statutes are
numerical outliers, their impact on the public-carry discussion is profound because they
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77. 554 U.S. at 626.
78. See id. at 628±30.
79. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 23, at 12 n.8 (stating, ³[t]o be sure, there is conflict between the
holding in Wrenn that a µgood cause¶ requirement is facially unconstitutional, and the holdings in Gould,
Woollard, Kachalsky and Drake, that a µgood cause¶ requirement facially comports with the Second
Amendment´).
80. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140 § 131(d).
81. HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-9(a).
82. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-4(c).
83. MD. CODE ANN. PUB. SAFETY § 5-306(a)(6)(ii).
84. N.Y. PENAL LAW §400.00(2)(f).
85. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. PUB. SAFETY § 5-306; HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-9; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-4;
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140 § 131(d).
86. E.g., Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 656 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (³[L]iving or working µin a high
crime area shall not by itself establish a good reason¶ to carry . . . ´); Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701
F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 2012) (³A generalized desire to carry a concealed weapon to protect one¶s person and
property does not constitute µproper cause.¶´); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 870 (4th Cir. 2013)
(³[A]pprehended danger cannot be established by . . . a µvague threat¶ or a general fear of µliv[ing] in a dangerous
society.¶´).
87. See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 439 (3d Cir. 2013).
88. See id.
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include some of the most populous states in the nation. 89 In contrast, recall that the
majority of states have adopted shall-issue statutes and grant public-carry licenses to all
law-abiding citizens with no mental health concerns or significant criminal records without
requiring any special showing of need for self-defense.90
B. Conflicting Views of the Second Amendment’s Core: Analysis of the Circuit Split
Prior to Young v. Hawaii
To date, the constitutionality of good-cause statutes has turned on the examining
FRXUW¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKH6HFRQG$PHQGPHQW¶VFRUHJXDUDQWHH 91 As will be explored
below, circuits that place public-carry outside the core have upheld good-cause statutes
when challenged on Second Amendment grounds. On the other hand, circuits that situate
public-carry within the core have struck down good-cause statutes as impermissible
constitutional infringements.
i. The Restricted Core: According to Heller, the Core Guarantee of the Right to
Keep and Bear Arms is Limited to the Home
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89. See WEBSTER, supra note 8, at 2.
90. Id; Johnson, supra note 8, at 231 n.3; see also Handgun Licensing FAQ, supra note 9; Eligibility
Requirements for a Florida Concealed Weapon License, supra note 9.
91. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 93±94, 101 (upholding a good-cause statute after first determining that publiccarry did not lie at the core of the Second Amendment); Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 671, 675 (1st Cir. 2018)
(upholding a good-cause statute after first determining that public-carry does not lie at the core); Wrenn, 864
F.3d at 661, 665±66 (striking down a good-cause statute after determining that public-carry is part of the Second
Amendment¶s core guarantee).
92. See generally Kachalsky, 701 F.3d 81.
93. Id. at 83±84; N.Y. PENAL LAW §400.00(2)(f).
94. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 88.
95. Id. at 86.
96. Id. at 89.
97. Id.
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The initial circuit court opinion on the right to carry a handgun in public for selfdefense was offered by the Second Circuit.92 In Kachalsky v. County of Westchester,
several plaintiffs sought licenses to carry concealed handguns; each was denied for failure
WR HVWDEOLVK ³SURSHU-FDXVH´ DV UHTXLUHG E\ 1HZ <RUN¶V OLFHQVLQJ VWDWXWH 93 Relying on
Heller, the complainants argued that the proper-cause requirement was an unconstitutional
restraint on their Second Amendment rights. 94 The Kachalsky court noted that while
proper-FDXVHZDVQRWVWDWXWRULO\GHILQHGFRPPRQODZYLHZHGLWDVD³GHPRQVWUDW>LRQ@RI
a special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of the general community or of
SHUVRQVHQJDJHGLQWKHVDPHSURIHVVLRQ´95
While analyzing the challenged statute, the Kachalsky court conceded that, in the
wake of Heller, the extent of the Second Amendment guarantee beyond the home is
unknown.96 The Second Circuit then made an important assumption when it observed that
³>D@OWKRXJKWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VFDVHVDSSlying the Second Amendment have arisen only
in connection with prohibitions on the possession of firearms in the home . . . [,] the
Amendment must have some application in the very different context of the public
SRVVHVVLRQRIILUHDUPV´97 It then turned its attention to the appropriate level of scrutiny to
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98. Id. at 93.
99. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 93.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 94.
102. See id. at 96±97.
103. See id. at 98±99.
104. See 701 F.3d at 93 (discussing the ban struck down in Heller and noting that certain handgun restrictions
may fail under any standard of judicial scrutiny).
105. Id. at 98±99.
106. Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 436 (3d Cir. 2013) (³[T]he core of the right conferred upon individuals by
the Second Amendment is the right to possess usable handguns in the home for self-defense.´); Woollard v.
Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 874 (4th Cir. 2013) (³Heller . . . was principally concerned with the µcore protection¶
of the Second Amendment: µthe right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and
home.¶´); Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 671 (1st Cir. 2018) (³[T]he core Second Amendment right is limited
to self-defense in the home.´).
107. Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876; Gould, 907 F.3d at 672±73, 675. Note that the Third Circuit actually did not
determine that the challenged statute in Drake needed to withstand intermediate scrutiny because it did not burden
conduct protected by the Second Amendment. However, in dicta, the court noted that if the statute had been
subjected to intermediate scrutiny it would have passed constitutional muster under that standard. Drake, 724
F.3d at 429±30, 436.
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apply to the challenged statute.98 In doing so, the court focused on defining the core of the
Second Amendment because it reasoned that a lower level of scrutiny could be applied to
a statute that does not infringe on the core than could be applied to a statute that does.99
The Second Circuit then invoked Heller in support of a restricted view of the core
ZKHQLWQRWHG³Heller H[SODLQVWKDWWKHµFRUH¶SURWHFWLRQRIWKH6HFRQG$PHQGPHQWLVWKH
µULJKWRIODZ-DELGLQJUHVSRQVLEOHFLWL]HQVWRXVHDUPVLQGHIHQVHRIKHDUWKDQGKRPH¶´ 100
Accordingly, the Kachalsky FRXUWFRQFOXGHGWKDW1HZ<RUN¶VSURSHU-cause statute, which
only affected the right to possess firearms in public, was not a restriction on the core. 101
By WKHFRXUW¶V own estimation, its finding that the challenged statute did not implicate the
core permitted it to apply intermediate scrutiny. 102 This narrow interpretation of the core
allowed the court to weigh the individual right to possess a handgun in public (absent the
demonstration of a special need for self-GHIHQVH  YHUVXV WKH 6WDWH¶V LQWHUHVWV LQ FULPH
prevention and public safety.103 While conducting its analysis, the Kachalsky court
acknowledged that if the statute had burdened the core of the Second Amendment, the
application of a higher level of scrutiny would likely have been required.104 However,
upon finding that the core was not impacted, the court observed that the proper-cause
UHTXLUHPHQWVXEVWDQWLDOO\UHODWHGWRWKH VWDWH¶VLQWHUHVWRISURPRWLQJ public safety, and,
accordingly, ruled that the statute, which limited lawful handgun possession to a subset of
law-abiding citizens (those able to demonstrate proper-cause), was constitutional.105
As evidenced by similar rulings from the First, Third, and Fourth Circuits, the core
as defined by Kachalsky is logical and can be reasonably inferred from Heller.106 These
circuits have followed Kachalsky¶V lead and upheld good-cause statutes under
intermediate scrutiny reasoning that, although such statutes do infringe Second
$PHQGPHQW ULJKWV WKH\ GR QRW LQIULQJH WKH $PHQGPHQW¶V FRUH 107 While Heller¶V
pronouncement of a core lawful purpose of self-defense does not seem to implicate any
location-EDVHGOLPLWDWLRQVWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶V adamant tone regarding the sanctity of the
right to self-defense within the home cannot be ignored. Far from ignoring it, Kachalsky
HOHYDWHGLW+RZHYHUWKLVZLGHO\DFFHSWHGYLHZWKDWWKHFRUHLVOLPLWHGWRRQH¶VGZHOOLQJ
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108. 701 F.3d at 93.
109. 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
110. Id. at 575±76; see also Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1069 (2018) (stating ³we afford little weight to
Heller’s emphasis on the application of the Second Amendment to the home specifically, for the challenge there
exclusively concerned handgun possession in the home´).
111. See Young, 896 F.3d at 1069 (stating ³we afford little weight to Heller’s emphasis on the application of
the Second Amendment to the home specifically, for the challenge there exclusively concerned handgun
possession in the home´).
112. 554 U.S. at 630.
113. Id. at 628.
114. See Blocher, supra note 18, at 219±20 (³If a person . . . wants a gun because he is in immediate danger of
being killed by violent criminals . . . then his claim to carry a weapon in public would fall squarely within the
µcore¶ interest of self-defense.´).
115. See, e.g., Crystal Hill, 75-Year-Old Uber Driver was Picking up a Rider. An Attack Almost Took his Life,
he Says, MIAMI HERALD (June 22, 2018, 4:50 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/national/article213676669.html; Travis Fedschun, Las Vegas Uber Driver Pummeled by Passengers in
Attack Caught on Video, FOX NEWS (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.foxnews.com/us/uber-driver-in-las-vegasattacked-by-passengers-after-refusing-to-give-ride.
116. Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 2012).
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is not without its detractors, and it has its weaknesses. Consider again Kachalsky¶V
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI WKH FRUH ³Heller H[SODLQV WKDW WKH µFRUH¶ SURWHFWLRQ RI WKH 6HFRQG
$PHQGPHQWLVWKH µULJKWRIODZ-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of
KHDUWKDQGKRPH¶´108 While it is sensible to surmise that Kachalsky¶V interpretation of the
core is what Heller meant, that is not exactly what Heller said.
While Heller noted that the Second Amendment elevates, above all other interests,
the right to possess handguns in the home, 109 the contested statute in Heller had no
application outside the home.110 Therefore, arguably, a definitive beyond-the-home
examination of Second Amendment rights would have been unnecessary.111 Heller simply
RSLQHGWKDWWKH³FRUHODZIXOSXUSRVH´RIWKHULJKWWRNHHSDQGEHDUDUPVLVVHOI-defense,112
DQGDOVRQRWHGWKDW³WKHLQKHUHQWULJKWRIVHOI-defense is central to the Second Amendment
ULJKW´113 If the core of the Second Amendment is the right to self-defense, does it not
follow that when the need to defend oneself arises beyond the home, the core is
triggered?114 Can it be that every time a person exits her front door she forfeits this right?
$V D PDWWHU RI SUDFWLFDO DSSOLFDWLRQ UHFDOO -RKQ +HQGULFNV¶V VWRU\ :KHUH ZRXOG
1HZ<RUN¶VVWDWXWHOHDYHKLP"7KHGHFLVLRQWRVXSSOHPHQWRQH¶VLQFRPHDVDQ8EHU driver
can be an inherently dangerous one.115 Uber drivers inevitably contact, and are confined
in a vehicle with, strangers, often in groups, who display a wide range of sanity, sobriety,
and emotional states. For many considering such employment, this risk may be tempered
by laws that allow them to carry firearms for self-defense. However, if Mr. Hendricks lived
in New York, he simply could not choose to do so because a general, unspecified desire
for self-protection is insufficient to establish proper-cause.116 As a result, Mr. Hendricks
would have a decision to make. Some would argue that the simplest solution would be to
find another job. But what if Mr. Hendricks, for a variety of legitimate reasons, was unable
to do so and working as an Uber driver remained his best or only option? He would be
forced either to carry a firearm in violation of the law to defend himself if necessary, or
routinely expose himself to potentially dangerous situations with no means of selfprotection. Arguably, this is a choice between equally poor alternatives. By concluding
that a right to public-carry lies at the core of the Second Amendment guarantee, other
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circuits provide individuals, like Mr. Hendricks, who desire to carry handguns for selfdefense with a more attractive option.
ii. The Expanded Core: According to Heller, the Core Guarantee of the Right to
Keep and Bear Arms is Fully Applicable in Public
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117. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935±36 (7th Cir. 2012).
118. Id. at 934±35.
119. Id. at 942 (The Court did not immediately strike down the law. Instead it gave the state Legislature 180
days to craft a new gun law ³consistent with . . . public safety and the Second Amendment´).
120. Id. at 935.
121. Id. at 936.
122. Moore, 702 F.3d at 936.
123. 864 F.3d 650, 656 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 655.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 657.
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Disagreement with Kachalsky was immediate. Fifteen days after the Second
&LUFXLW¶VGHFLVLRQWKH6HYHQWK&LUFXLWKHOGWKat the right to self-defense extends beyond
the home.117 In Moore v. Madigan, the appellants argued that an Illinois law that
prohibited individuals, other than police officers and security guards, from carrying guns
in public ran afoul of the Second Amendment as interpreted by Heller.118 While the Moore
FRXUWGLGQRWLQYDOLGDWH,OOLQRLV¶SXEOLF-carry statute,119 it outlined the logic by which such
a statute could be deemed unconstitutional. In Moore, Judge Posner dissected Heller¶V
reasoning that the need for self-defense is most acute inside the home, and he noted that
Heller did not imply that the need to defend oneself has no salience in other locations. 120
Importantly, Judge Posner observed that the Second Amendment encompasses both a right
to bear arms as well as a right to keep them, 121 and reasoned that the right to bear arms
seems to extend beyond the home.122 Although Moore gave little attention to the
boundaries of the core, it provided a roadmap by which a court could expand the core
beyond that adopted by Kachalsky. In 2017, the D.C. Circuit took that opportunity.
In Wrenn v. District of Columbia, two plaintiffs filed suit, claiming that their Second
Amendment rights were violated after they were denied concealed-carry licenses (the only
method of carry allowed under the D.C. Code)123 because of their inability to show a
special need for self-defense.124 Under the D.C. good-cause statute, concealed-carry
OLFHQVHVZHUHDWWDLQDEOHRQO\E\WKRVHDEOHWRVKRZD³JRRGUHDVRQ´WRIHDULQMXU\ 125 Good
reason was interpretHG DV ³D VSHFLDO QHHG IRU VHOI-protection distinguishable from the
general community as supported by evidence of specific threats or previous attacks that
GHPRQVWUDWHDVSHFLDOGDQJHUWRWKHDSSOLFDQW¶VOLIH´126
The D.C. Circuit signaled a pending circuit split when it offered its interpretation of
the core of the Second Amendment, which contrasted notably with the interpretation of
the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits. As understood by Wrenn³>W@KHµFRUH¶RUµFHQWUDO
FRPSRQHQW¶RIWKH6HFRQG$PHQGPHQWULJKWWRNHHSDQGEHDUDUPVSURWHFWVµLQGLYLGXDO
self-GHIHQVH¶E\µODZ-DELGLQJUHVSRQVLEOHFLWL]HQV¶´127 This interpretation, which did not
signal any type of home-based limitation, was then directly applied to the question of
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128. Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 657.
129. Id. (emphasis added).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 657; see also PATRICK J. CHARLES, HISTORICISM, ORIGINALISM, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE USE
AND ABUSE OF THE PAST IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 122±23 (2014) (³To be clear, according to the tenets of
originalism, the Second Amendment protects the right to µkeep arms¶ and the right to µbear arms.¶ The right to
µkeep arms¶ embodies a right to retain, have in custody or have weapons, and [the] right to µbear arms¶ is
understood as a right to carry.´).
133. 864 F.3d at 661.
134. Id. at 664.
135. Id. at 664±66.
136. Id. at 665±66.
137. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 575±76 (2008); see also Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044,
1069 (9th Cir. 2018) (stating, ³we afford little weight to Heller’s emphasis on the application of the Second
Amendment to the home specifically, for the challenge there exclusively concerned handgun possession in the
home´).
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whether the core extended to public-carry.128 Wrenn reasoned that if the core guarantee is
the right to self-defense, Heller¶V KROGLQJ³GRHVQ¶WPHDQWKDWVHOI-defense at home is the
only ULJKW DW WKH $PHQGPHQW¶V FRUH´129 Following Moore¶V template, the D.C. Circuit
argued in favor of their view by emphasizing that the Second Amendment includes both a
right to keep130 and a right to bear,131 and pointed out that in Heller, the Supreme Court
gave seemingly equal treatment to these independent concepts despite the fact that the
specific facts of Heller arguably only involved the right to keep arms. 132 Wrenn then set a
QHZ FRXUVH DQG H[SDQGHG WKH FRUH RI WKH 6HFRQG $PHQGPHQW E\ KROGLQJ WKDW ³WKH
individual right to carry common firearms beyond the home for self-defense²even in
densely populated areas, even for those lacking special self-defense needs²falls within
WKHFRUHRIWKH6HFRQG$PHQGPHQW¶VSURWHFWLRQ´ 133
After determining that public-carry is part of the core guarantee, the D.C. Circuit
turned its attention to the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to the challenged statute.134
It held that the D.C. good-reason law was a total ban enacted against most law-abiding
citizens, namely those who lacked a special need for self-defense, and therefore it
destroyed the Second Amendment guarantee of the very class it was designed to protect:
law-abiding citizens.135 Accordingly, the Wrenn court took the Heller approach and
declined to apply any level of scrutiny, holding that such a destruction of the core of the
Second Amendment would fail any judicial test.136
The core as defined by Wrenn was a vast extension of the core contemplated by
Kachalsky and its progeny. Although both variants find support in Heller, the Wrenn
interpretation, that the core encompasses a right to public-carry even in the absence of a
heightened need for self-defense, is on more equal footing with Heller. As previously
discussed, while Heller limited its holding to the home, the challenged statute in that case
was a ban on the possession of operable handguns in the home.137 Arguably, such a statute
ZRXOGRQO\LQYRNHWKHULJKWWR³NHHS´DUPV ZKLFKZRXOGVHQVLEO\DSSO\ZLWKLQWKHKRPH 
DQGOHDYHXQWRXFKHGDQ\FRQFHUQRYHUWKHULJKWWR³EHDU´WKHP ZKLFKORJLFDOO\H[WHQGV
to public settings). Nonetheless, as noted by Wrenn, the Heller Court felt compelled to
devote a considerable portion of its opinion to the discussion of the meaning of ³NHHS´DV
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RSSRVHGWRWKHPHDQLQJRI³EHDU´138 In doing so, the Supreme Court reasoned that the
ZRUG³EHDU´LVSURSHUO\XQGHUVWRRGDVFDUU\LQJDZHDSRQXSRQRQH¶VSHUVRQLQFORWKLQJRU
in a pocket.139 As pointed out by the D.C. Circuit, in Heller, the highest Court gave no
indication that the right to bear arms was inferior to the right to keep them. 140 Further,
recall that the core lawful purpose of the Second Amendment as defined by Heller is to
guarantee an individual right to use handguns for self-defense.141 While it was Heller¶V
opinion that this right is at its apex in the home, 142 it seems to cut against the spirit of
Heller to conclude that individuals forgo their self-defense right on the ground that, while
in public, their need to exercise that right is less critical in the eyes of the judiciary. 143
Wrenn¶V beyond-the-home expansion of the core Second Amendment guarantee was
the antithesis of the core as interpreted by the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits. Wrenn
created divergent views of the scope of the constitutional right to bear arms. Accordingly,
when the Ninth Circuit took up the issue in Young v. Hawaii, it had two apparent options
to choose from²either the core is limited to the home, or it extends to the public. In a
sense, the Young court rejected both and shifted the core in a new direction.
C. The Contribution of Young v. Hawaii: The Shifting Core of the Right to Keep and
Bear Arms Exposed
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138. Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 657 (referencing Heller and stating that ³the Court . . . spent over fifty pages giving
independent and seemingly equal treatment to the right to µkeep¶ and to µbear,¶ first defining those µphrases¶ and
then teasing out their implications´).
139. Heller, 554 U.S. at 584.
140. Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 657.
141. 554 U.S. at 630.
142. Id. at 628, 635.
143. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935±36 (7th Cir. 2012) (³Both Heller and McDonald do say that
µthe need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute¶ in the home, but that doesn¶t mean it is not acute
outside the home. Heller repeatedly invokes a broader Second Amendment right than the right to have a gun in
one¶s home . . . ´) (internal citations omitted).
144. 824 F.3d 919, 924, 939 (9th Cir. 2016).
145. Id. at 927, 939.
146. Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1068 (2018).
147. Id. at 1070.
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Young v. Hawaii ZDVQRWWKH1LQWK&LUFXLW¶VILUVWDQDO\VLVRIWKHLQGLYLGXDOULJKWWR
carry firearms in public. In the 2016 en banc ruling of Peruta v. County of San Diego, the
Ninth Circuit determined that the Second Amendment does not, in any manner, protect an
individual right to carry concealed firearms beyond the home. 144 Interestingly, and
perhaps as a harbinger of Young, the Peruta court went out of its way to address the issue
of open-carry by noting that, although there is no concealed-carry right, there may or may
not be an individual Second Amendment right to carry firearms in public in some
manner.145
During the summer of 2018, the Ninth Circuit revisited the issue in Young and
concluded that while there is no constitutional right to concealed-carry,146 the Second
Amendment does, at its core, protect the right of law-abiding citizens to carry firearms
openly in public.147 While this interpretation of the core is more similar to Wrenn than
Kachalsky in that it includes some method of public-carry, it is distinct from all previous
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circuit level interpretations of the core. The core as defined by Young includes only a right
to a specific manner of public-carry²open-carry²and thus illustrates that the Second
$PHQGPHQW¶VFRUHLVPDOOHDEOHDQGVXVFHSWLEOHWRYDU\LQJLQWHrpretations.
The holding in Young has two notable deficiencies. First, the Ninth Circuit sent
mixed signals regarding the constitutionality of good-cause statutes that fall short of
complete bans on public-carry. Second, the Young court over-utilized the historical
approach to Second Amendment analysis by using history to pinpoint a precise method of
public-FDUU\WKDWOLHVDWWKH$PHQGPHQW¶VFRUH
i. The Young +ROGLQJ%ULQJ<RXU*XQVEXWRQO\LI<RX¶UH0DQ(QRXJKWR6KRZ
µ(P
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148. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-9.
149. Young, 896 F.3d at 1048; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 134-23, 134-24, 134-25.
150. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-9.
151. Id.
152. Young, 896 F.3d at 1048. But see Defendant-Appellees Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 8±9, Young v.
Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 12-17808) (stating that the Court characterization of the open-carry
standard
is
³a
[f]undamental
[m]isunderstading
of
Hawaii
[l]aw´)
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Link/Docket/Blob/ecf/CTA9/009030337278,239321/12-17808_DocketEntry_0914-2018_155.pdf?courtNorm=CTA9&courtnumber=2045&casenumber=1217808&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentImage&uniqueId=59011204-59f4-42c0bb04-a3439ee8b6e8&localImageGuid=I2aec9db0b8ed11e8966fbfbf4347e034&contextData=(sc.Default)&
attachments=false.
153. Young, 896 F.3d at 1048.
154. Id. at 1049±50.
155. Id. at 1052±64.
156. See Heller v. District of Columbia, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008) (³Putting all these textual elements together,
we find that they guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation. This
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Young centered on the constituWLRQDOLW\ RI +DZDLL¶V JRRG-cause statute.148 The
specific statute offered limited exceptions to the general statutory scheme restricting
ILUHDUPSRVVHVVLRQWRDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VKRPHRUEXVLQHVV 149 In order to carry a concealed
firearm, the statute required a dePRQVWUDWLRQ RI ³DQ H[FHSWLRQDO FDVH´ LQ ZKLFK ³DQ
applicant show[ed] reason to fear injury´150 Regarding open-carry, an applicant was
UHTXLUHGWRGHPRQVWUDWHWKDWWKHQHHGWRFDUU\DILUHDUPRSHQO\³KD>G@EHHQVXIILFLHQWO\
LQGLFDWHG´DQGWKHDSSOLFDQW ³>ZD@VHQJDJHGLQ WKHSURWHFWLRQ RIOLIH DQGSURSHUW\´ 151
Hawaii County later promoted regulations that clarified the open-carry standard essentially
OLPLWHGWKHULJKWWRLQGLYLGXDOV³LQWKHDFWXDOSHUIRUPDQFHRI>WKHLU@GXWLHV´PHDQLQJWKDW
open-FDUU\ZDVDUHTXLUHPHQWRIWKHDSSOLFDQW¶VSURIHVVLRQ 152 Seeking to carry in either
fashion (openly or concealed), George Young, the petitioner, was twice denied by Hawaii
County.153 +H ILOHG VXLW DOOHJLQJ WKDW WKH FRXQW\¶V GHQLDOV ZKLFK ZHUH EDVHG RQ KLV
iQDELOLW\WRVDWLVI\HLWKHUWKH³H[FHSWLRQDOFDVH´RUWKH³HQJDJHGLQWKHSURWHFWLRQRIOLIH
DQGSURSHUW\´VWDQGDUGVZHUHXQFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLQIULQJHPHQWVRQKLV6HFRQG$PHQGPHQW
right.154
The Ninth Circuit conducted an exhaustive historical analysis of gun rights similar
to and overlapping with the analysis done in Heller.155 Although the method of analysis
was similar, Young¶V objective was different. Recall that Heller looked to history to
determine whether an individual right of self-defense existed.156 Moving forward from
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Heller¶V conclusion that such a right does exist, Young utilized history to determine the
scope and the precise nature of the right. 157 Following its analysis of history, the Young
FRXUWGHWHUPLQHGWKDW³WKHULJKWWREHDUDUPVPXVWJXDUDQWHHsome right to self-defense in
SXEOLF´158 7KXVLWFRQFOXGHGWKDW+DZDLL¶VILUHDUPUHJXODWLRQVEXUGHQHG<RXQJ¶V6HFRQG
Amendment rights.159 The Ninth Circuit then contemplated the appropriate level of
scrutiny to apply to the challenged statute. 160 In doing so, it FRQVLGHUHGWZRIDFWRUV³  
how close the law c[ame] to the core of the Second Amendment right, and (2) the severity
RIWKHODZ¶VEXUGHQRQWKHULJKW´ 161 The Ninth Circuit reasoned, as had other courts that
had previously taken up the issue, that a law which so restricted the core that it effectively
destroyed the Second Amendment guarantee would likely fail under any level of
scrutiny.162 On the other hand, the Young court noted that the application of intermediate
scrutiny was appropriate if the challenged statute did not implicate the core.163
The Ninth Circuit focused on Heller¶V implication that the core purpose of the
Second Amendment right²self-defense²is not limited to the home164 EHFDXVH³>Z@KLOH
WKH$PHQGPHQW¶VJXDUDQWHHRIDULJKWWRµNHHS¶DUPVHIIHFWXates the core purpose of selfGHIHQVHZLWKLQWKHKRPHWKHVHSDUDWHULJKWWRµEHDU¶DUPVSURWHFWVWKHFRUHSXUSRVHRXWVLGH
WKHKRPH´165 The Young court then fell back on its holding in Peruta and reasoned that,
although there is no constitutional right to carry a firearm in a concealed manner,166 the
³ULJKW WR FDUU\ D ILUHDUP RSHQO\ IRU VHOI-defense falls within the core of the Second
$PHQGPHQW´167 Upon finding that the core guarantee includes a right to open-carry, the
Young FRXUWDGGUHVVHG+DZDLL¶VVWDWXWHZKich limited open-FDUU\WRWKRVH³HQJDJHGLQWKH
SURWHFWLRQ RI OLIH DQG SURSHUW\´ 168 The court observed that the Second Amendment
protects law-abiding citizens, and therefore, it must secure a right to bear arms for typical
members of that class.169 Accordingl\LWKHOGWKDW+DZDLL¶VVWDWXWHZKLFKOLPLWHGWKHULJKW
to open-carry to security guards and others similarly situated,170 excluded the majority of
the class it was intended to protect, and therefore it would fail under any level of judicial
scrutiny.171
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meaning is strongly confirmed by the historical background of the Second Amendment.´).
157. Young, 896 F.3d at 1068 (³Concluding our analysis of text and review of history, we remain unpersuaded
. . . that the Second Amendment only has force within the home. Once identified as an individual right focused
on self-defense, the right to bear arms must guarantee some right to self-defense in public. While the concealed
carry of firearms categorically falls outside such protection, we are satisfied that the Second Amendment
encompasses a right to carry a firearm openly in public for self-defense.´).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Young, 896 F.3d at 1068.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1069.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1068.
167. Young, 896 F.3d at 1070.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1071.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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In VXPWKH1LQWK&LUFXLW¶VUXOLQJLQ Young confirmed and expanded its ruling in
Peruta. Taken together, these cases stand for the proposition that there is no Second
Amendment protection whatsoever for the right to carry a concealed handgun 172 but an
individual right to carry a firearm openly lies at the core of the Amendment. 173 While the
Young court laid out Heller and McDonald¶V support for its conclusion that a right to carry
firearms for self-defense beyond the home does exist,174 Young¶V nuanced, open-carryonly interpretation of the core is unique. It is the only circuit opinion to reach beyond a
ruling on the extent of the Second Amendment guarantee (that is, whether it exists in
public) and to rule on the precise nature of the guarantee (that is, only a right to open-carry
in public exists). From a practical standpoint, Young¶V open-carry-only ruling seems an
odd result. In fact, one would likely be among friends if this holding invokes images of
leather-skinned, steely-eyed gunslingers squaring off with nervous hands hovering above
their six-shooters.
With Young LQPLQGWKLQNEDFNWR-RKQ+HQGULFNV¶VVWRU\1RZLPDJLQHWKDWKHLV
an Uber driver in Honolulu and wishes to carry a firearm at work for self-protection. If he
is only permitted to carry the firearm openly displayed on his hip, the effect on his income
potential seems significant. Today, most of his customers would be put off at best, and
terrified at worst, of the prospect of being escorted about town by a stranger visibly toting
a pistol on his belt.175 $VVXFK0U+HQGULFNV¶VRSWLRQVZRXOGODUJHO\EHWKHVDPHDVWKH\
ZHUHLQ1HZ<RUN+DZDLL¶VVWDWXWHOHDYHVKLPZLWKDFKRLFHKHPD\DFFHSWWKHULVNRI
lost income and carry openly, he may carry his weapon in a more socially acceptable²
but statutorily prohibited²manner (i.e., concealed),176 or he may ignore his safety
concerns and work unarmed.177 However, a further issue remains. Assuming Mr.
Hendricks chose to comply with the statute and wished to carry openly, in the wake of
Young, what must he demonstrate, if anything, in order to obtain his open-carry permit?
As will be discussed below, the answer is less than clear.

At first glance, Young appears to reject the constitutionality of good-cause statutes,
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172. Young, 896 F.3d at 1068; Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 939 (9th Cir. 2016).
173. Young, 896 F.3d at 1070. Interestingly, this holding was essentially predicted in 2014. See generally
Jonathan Meltzer, Open Carry for All: Heller and Our Nineteenth-Century Second Amendment, 123 YALE L.J.
1486 (2014).
174. See Young, 896 F.3d at 1070 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008);
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 787 (2010)) (stating ³we reject a cramped reading of the Second
Amendment that renders to µkeep¶ and to µbear¶ unequal guarantees. Heller and McDonald describe the core
purpose of the Second Amendment as self-defense, and µbear¶ effectuates such core purpose of self-defense in
public.´).
175. Symposium, Heller and Public Carry Restrictions, 40 CAMPBELL L. REV. 431, 432 (2018) [hereinafter
Symposium] (proposing that in today¶s society openly displaying a firearm is considered provocative and very
aggressive); See Meltzer, supra note 173, at 1526 (crediting Eugene Volokh with the proposition that due to
social norms and the stigma against open carry, a right to open-carry would only deter law-abiding citizens from
carrying at all).
176. Symposium, supra note 175, at 432.
177. Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical
Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1522 (2009).
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ii. The Young Holding Failed to Rule Decisively on the Constitutionality of GoodCause Statutes
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178. See Young, 896 F.3d at 1071 (³[I]f the Amendment is for law-abiding citizens as a rule, then it must
secure gun access at least for each typical member of that class.´) (quoting Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864
F.3d 650, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2017)).
179. Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 665±66 (2017) (³[T]he point of the Amendment isn¶t to
ensure that some guns would find their way in to D.C., but that guns would be available to each responsible
citizen as a rule . . . . So if Heller I dictates a certain treatment of µtotal bans¶ on Second Amendment rights, that
treatment must apply to total bans on carrying (or possession) by ordinarily situated individuals covered by the
Amendment. This point brings into focus the legally decisive fact: the good-reason law is necessarily a total ban
on most D.C. residents¶ right to carry a gun in the face of ordinary self-defense needs . . . . [I]t looks precisely
for needs µdistinguishable¶ from those of the community.´).
180. Young, 896 F.3d at 1070.
181. See id. at 1052, 1058, 1062, 1064, 1069±71, 1074.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1071 (citing Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 665).
184. Id.
185. 864 F.3d at 664±66.
186. Young, 896 F.3d at 1071.
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at least to the extent that they infringe upon open-carry rights.178 Such a conclusion would
place Young squarely on Wrenn¶V side of the circuit divide.179 The simple fact that the
Young court placed the right to open-FDUU\ZLWKLQWKH6HFRQG$PHQGPHQW¶VFRUHVXSSRUWV
the inference that the Ninth Circuit agreed with Wrenn.180 Young¶VDSSDUHQWFRQFXUUHQFH
LV IXUWKHU GHPRQVWUDWHG E\ WKH 1LQWK &LUFXLW¶V UHSHDWHG FLWDWLRQV WR Wrenn, with each
reference being either favorable or neutral.181 Certainly, none of Young¶V abundant
discussion of Wrenn FRQYH\HG DQ\ VHQVH RI GLVDJUHHPHQW ZLWK WKH '& &LUFXLW¶V
analysis.182
Perhaps most importantly, the Young court seemingly agreed with Wrenn¶V logic
that Second Amendment challenges must be decided by analyzing their effect on typically
situated, law-abiding citizens.183 The Young court even went so far as to quote Wrenn¶V
DVVHUWLRQ WKDW ³LIWKH>6HFRQG@$PHQGPHQWLVIRUODZ-abiding citizens as a rule, then it
must secure gun access aWOHDVWIRUHDFKW\SLFDOPHPEHURIWKDWFODVV´ 184 It is crucial to
recall that in Wrenn, the D.C. Circuit rejected a good-cause statute because it prevented
most law abiding citizens²those who lacked good-cause²from exercising their core
Second Amendment right of public-carry.185
After announcing Wrenn¶V law-abiding citizen standard as its guidepost, the Young
FRXUWUHDVRQHGWKDW³WKH6HFRQG$PHQGPHQWSURWHFWVWKHULJKWRIindividuals to keep and
bear arms, not groups of individuals. An individual right that does not apply to ordinary
citizens would be a contradiction in terms; its existence would wax and wane with the
ZKLPVRIWKHUXOLQJPDMRULW\´186 Such language naturally leads to the inference that the
Ninth Circuit believed that all law-abiding citizens²including those who lack goodcause²have a constitutional right to carry firearms in public for self-defense. If the Young
court did in fact intend to grant an individual open-carry right to all law-abiding citizens,
the result could be a sweeping change to the status quo in Hawaii. However, the Ninth
CLUFXLW¶VDWWLWXGHWRZDUGJRRG-cause statutes was somewhat veiled in Young, and there is
DOHJLWLPDWHDUJXPHQWWKDWVXFKGUDVWLFFKDQJHZDVQRWWKHFRXUW¶VJRDO
The counterargument is that Young¶V holding should not be interpreted as
disfavoring legitimate good-cause statutes. Instead, it should be read only as a rejection of
outright bans on open-carry. The distinction is critical. Remember that the split between
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the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits on one side and the D.C. Circuit on the other
stems from a divergence of opinion over the constitutionality of good-cause statutes.187
However, circuits on both sides of the divide appear to believe that outright bans on publiccarry²that is, bans that deny the right even to those who demonstrate good-cause²are
more likely to be unconstitutional.188 Perhaps Young only stands for the proposition that
complete open-carry bans are unconstitutional. Since the Young holding is somewhat
opaque, the conclusion that the Ninth Circuit only intended to convey its disapproval of
outright bans may also reasonably be inferred. Consider the following excerpt from Young:
Restricting open carry to those whose job entails protecting life or property necessarily
restricts open carry to a small and insulated subset of law-abiding citizens. Just as the Second
Amendment does not protect a right to bear arms only in connection with a militia, it surely
does not protect a right to bear arms only as a security guard. The typical law-abiding citizen
in the State of Hawaii is therefore entirely foreclosed from exercising the core Second
Amendment right to bear arms for self-defense.189
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187. Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 676±77 (1st Cir. 2018); Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d
81, 101 (2d Cir. 2012); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 434 (3d Cir. 2013); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865,
882 (4th Cir. 2013); Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 664±67 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
188. This assertion is based on the fact that, in all of the following cases, the examining courts appear to make
a point of distinguishing the laws they eventually declare valid under intermediate scrutiny from laws that operate
as complete bans on public-carry. Presumably, this leads to the conclusion that these court consider complete
public-carry bans to be more constitutionally problematic. See Gould, 907 F.3d at 674; Woollard, 712 F.3d at
881 n.10; Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 91; Drake, 724 F.3d at 440.
189. 896 F.3d at 1071.
190. See id. at 1071±72; see also Gould, 907 F.3d at 674 (noting that in Young, ³[t]he Ninth Circuit took pains
to distinguish the Hawaii law from laws in which the µgood cause¶ standard µdid not disguise an effective ban on
the public carry of firearms¶´).
191. Young, 896 F.3d at 1072.
192. Id. at 1071±72.
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If this passage merely means that all law-abiding citizens²not just those who are
security guards²must be given the opportunity to establish good-cause before their opencarry applications are accepted or rejected, then Young¶V impact on Hawaiian gun laws
and its contribution to the public-carry discussion are greatly minimized. The Ninth
&LUFXLW¶VREVHUYDWLRQWKDW+DZDLL¶VVWDWXWHZDVQRWDJRRG-cause statute at all but was more
akin to a de facto ban because, at least with regard to concealed carry, no license had ever
been granted by the county, hints that Young¶V holding may have been nothing more than
a rejection of outright bans.190 In fact, the Ninth Circuit went so far as to note its belief
that even the circuits that had previously upheld good-cause statutes would have struck
GRZQ D UHVWULFWLRQ DV EXUGHQVRPH DV +DZDLL¶V 191 The court¶s discussion of legitimate
good-cause statutes versus total bans on public-carry was surprisingly brief. 192 Be that as
it may, the discussion arguably leads to the reasonable assumption that if the Ninth Circuit
KDG FRQVLGHUHG +DZDLL¶V RSHQ-carry restriction to be a legitimate good-cause statute it
might have upheld it.
If this is the correct interpretation of Young, then it is better-positioned against the
D.C. Circuit and with the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits. Under this view, Young
would only add the unique wrinkle that while a state may enact a complete ban on
concealed-carry, it must permit law-abiding citizens the opportunity to attempt to establish
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JRRGFDXVHWRFDUU\KDQGJXQVRSHQO\6RZKDWLVWKH1LQWK&LUFXLW¶VRSLQLRQUHJDUGLQJWKH
constitutionality of good-cause statutes that fall short of complete bans on open-carry?
Although the weight of the Young opinion appears to concur with Wrenn WKH FRXUW¶V
holding is ambiguous and leaves room for the argument that the Ninth Circuit would
uphold a good-cause statute so long as it was less similar to an outright ban on open-carry
than the one struck down in Young.
iii. The Young Court Over-Emphasized the Appropriate Role of Historical Analysis
Regardless of whether Young¶V holding is better understood as a rejection of the
constitutionality of good-cause statutes or merely as a rejection of complete open-carry
bans, it is out of step with modern sensibilities.193 While the ultimate pronouncement from
Young, that some form of public-carry lies at the core of the Second Amendment, is
arguably consistent with the spirit of Heller,194 the Young holding is deficient because it
places open-carry, and only open-FDUU\ZLWKLQWKH$PHQGPHQW¶VFRUH195 The logic that
led to this conclusion appears to be an over-application of history to the 1LQWK&LUFXLW¶V
Second Amendment analysis.
True, Heller relied on history when declaring the existence of an individual right to
handgun possession in the home. 196 And it is further true that circuit courts since Heller
have largely utilized a historical approach to determine the scope of the right (that is, does
it or does it not extend to public settings). 197 However, by relying on antiquated case law
expressing the preferences of open-carry versus concealed-carry that were contemporary
to the antebellum south,198 Young likely reached beyond the utility of history to determine
that only open-carry lies at the core of the Second Amendment. There comes a point when
the application of history is too tenuous, especially if used to place rights in, or keep them
out RIWKH6HFRQG$PHQGPHQW¶VQHDUO\XQWRXFKDEOHFRUH6RFLHWDOSUHIHUHQFHVUHJDUGLQJ
open-carry versus concealed-carry are not the same today: in fact, they are arguably
completely opposite.199
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193. Nine years prior to Young v. Hawaii, Eugene Volokh observed that if a court employed history to conclude
that the Second Amendment protected only a right to carry openly, it would arguably be mistaken given the
change in public opinion regarding public vs. concealed carry. See Volokh, supra note 177, at 1521±24.
194. See Young, 896 F.3d at 1070 (stating ³we reject a cramped reading of the Second Amendment that renders
to µkeep¶ and to µbear¶ unequal guarantees. Heller and McDonald describe the core purpose of the Second
Amendment as self-defense, and µbear¶ effectuates such core purpose of self-defense in public.´) (quoting District
of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 787 (2010)); see
also Volokh, supra note 177, at 1520 (stating ³[m]y inclination . . . is to defer . . . to a presumption that people
should be free to have the tools they need for self-defense until there is solid evidence that possession of those
tools will indeed cause serious harm. . . . Heller¶s discussion of the phrase ³keep and bear´ points in the same
direction´).
195. Young, 896 F.3d at 1069±70.
196. See 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008).
197. See, e.g., Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2012) (³History and tradition
do not speak with one voice here. What history demonstrates is that states often disagreed as to the scope of the
right to bear arms . . . ´); Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 658 (2017) (³Under Heller I¶s treatment
of these and earlier cases and commentaries, history matters . . . ´); Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d
919, 929 (9th Cir. 2016).
198. Young, 896 F.3d at 1054±57.
199. See Volokh, supra note 177, at 1524 (arguing against the legitimacy of concealed carry bans by stating
³[t]he historical exclusion [of a right to carry concealed] . . . was contingent on the social convention of the
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A review of the precedent Young utilized to determine that open-carry is the only
manner of public-carry within the core reveals fiery language regarding the concealedcarry of handguns. For example, in 1850, while discussing a state statute that restricted the
ULJKWWRFDUU\DFRQFHDOHGZHDSRQLQ/RXLVLDQDWKDWVWDWH¶V supreme court concluded:
The [concealed carry] act[,] . . . [which] PDNHV LW D PLVGHPHDQRU WR EH ³IRXQG ZLWK D
concealed weapon, such as a dirk, dagger, knife, pistol, or any other deadly weapon
concealed . . . [so] that [it] does not appear in full open view[,]´ . . . became absolutely
necessary to counteract a vicious state of society, growing out of the habit of carrying
concealed weapons, and to prevent bloodshed and assassinations committed upon
XQVXVSHFWLQJSHUVRQV,WLQWHUIHUHGZLWKQRPDQ¶VULJKWWRFDUU\DUPV . ³LQIXOORSHQYLHZ´
which places men upon an equality. This is the right guaranteed by the Constitution of the
United States, and which is calculated to incite men to a manly and noble defence of
themselves . . . without any tendency to secret advantages and unmanly assassinations.200
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time²the social legitimacy of open carry, and the sense that concealed carry was the behavior of criminals²
and this exclusion is no longer sustainable now that conventions are different´); Symposium, supra note 175, at
432 (proposing that in today¶s society openly displaying a firearm is considered provocative and very aggressive).
200. State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 489±90 (1850) (emphasis added).
201. 1 Ala. 612, 614, 616 (Ala. 1840).
202. Id. at 616±17, 619.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 616±17.
205. Id. at 619.
206. Reid, 1 Ala. at 616 (emphasis added).
207. 1 Ga. 243, 249 (Ga. 1846) (emphasis added).
208. Id. at 249, 251.
209. See Robert M. Ireland, The Problem of Concealed Weapons in Nineteenth-Century Kentucky, 91 REG.
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Moreover, in 1840, while interpreting the right to bear arms in State v. Reid, the
Alabama Supreme Court referred to concealed-FDUU\ DV ³WKH HYLO SUDFWLFH RI FDUU\LQJ
ZHDSRQV VHFUHWO\´201 and upheld a ban on concealed-carry, so long as some means of
public-carry was permitted.202 Notably, the allowance of some form of public-carry was
key to the court.203 It reasoned that a statute which prohibited public-carry entirely would
be unconstitutional,204 and it explicitly noted that the legislature could not justifiably
outlaw open-carry.205 After pronouncing the limits of legislative power regarding publiccarry restrictions, the Reid court affirmed the OHJLVODWXUH¶VDXWKRULW\WROLPLWWKHVSHFLILF
PDQQHURIFDUU\³DVPD\EHGLFWDWHGE\ the safety of the people and the advancement of
public morals´206 WKXVLPSO\LQJWKDW$ODEDPD¶VOHJLVODWXUHOLNHO\YLHZHGFRQFHDOHG-carry
as immoral. Further still, in Georgia, in 1846, the Nunn v. State court concluded that a
concealed-carry ban was constLWXWLRQDOEHFDXVHWKHEDQPHUHO\³SURKLELW>HG@WKHZHDULQJ
of certain weapons in such a manner as is calculated to exert an unhappy influence upon
the moral feelings of the wearer´207 In line with the high courts in Louisiana and
Alabama, the Georgia Supreme Court held that, while concealed-carry could be banned,
some form of public-carry must be permitted (leaving open-carry as the only logical
alternative).208
$OORIWKHVHFDVHVVWDQGIRUWKHVDPHLGHD'XULQJWKH¶VOHJLVODWXUHVHQDFWHG
and courts upheld concealed-carry bans because concealed-carry was considered a
devious, cowardly practice.209 On the other hand, the right to carry firearms openly, which
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was viewed as noble and upright,210 was permitted and could not constitutionally be
denied.211 The question that naturally follows is²what influence should these opinions
have had on the Ninth Circuit in 2018 as it endeavored to determine whether a specific
method of public-carry is permitted by the Constitution? While the Young court seemingly
assigned them great weight,212 their role in the 2018 decision should have been minimal
DW PRVW DQG FHUWDLQO\ QRW FRQWUROOLQJ EHFDXVH ³>W@KH KLVWRULFDO H[FOXVLRQ >RI FRQFHDOHG
carry] was contingent on the social conventions of the time . . . and this exclusion is no
longHUVXVWDLQDEOHQRZWKDWWKHFRQYHQWLRQVDUHGLIIHUHQW´ 213 Unlike the social norms in
the nineteenth-century South, modern opinion largely views the practice of open-carry as
aggressive and provocative.214 Arguably, most of present-day society would prefer that if
DQLQGLYLGXDOFKRRVHVWRFDUU\DILUHDUPLQSXEOLFWKH\³QRWIODXQWLW´WRWKHUHVWRIXV 215
In sum, although Heller makes clear that historical analysis is an important
consideration in resolving Second Amendment issues, 216 Young likely over-stepped the
ERXQGDULHVRIKLVWRU\¶VSURSHULQIOXHQFHVLQFH³WKHKLVWRULFDOKRVWLOLW\WRFRQFHDOHGFDUU\
>DSSHDUV@LQDSWWRGD\´217 Since the antebellum opinions Young relied on were exclusively
based on public-carry attitudes of a specific time and region, and further, since those
attitudes arguably no longer persist, Young used history to apply antiquated and irrelevant
social opinions to modern-day conduct.
Admittedly, a counter-argument can be made that Young¶V placement of open-carry
at the core was dictated by Heller.218 Obviously, Heller prevented the Young court from
working with a blank canvas,219 and there is language in Heller suggesting that concealedcarry bans may be lawful under the Second Amendment. 220 While pronouncing that
Second Amendment rights are not unlimLWHGDQGWKDW³WKHULJKWZDVQRWDULJKWWRNHHSDQG
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KY. HIST. SOC¶Y 370, 370±72 (1993) (asserting that those opposed to outlawing the practice of dueling to settle
disputes in Kentucky were giving license to cowards to arm themselves with concealed weapons); Volokh, supra
note 177, at 1521±23.
210. Volokh, supra note 177, at 1523 (³Carrying arms, the theory went, was µone of the most essential
privileges of freemen,¶ but µopen, manly, and chivalrous¶ people wore their guns openly . . . ´).
211. Reid, 1 Ala. at 619; State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 490 (1850); Nunn, 1 Ga. at 249.
212. 896 F.3d 1044, 1056±57 (9th Cir. 2018) (³[E]ven though our court has read these cases to exclude
concealed carry from the Second Amendment¶s protections, . . . the same cases command that the Second
Amendment must encompass a right to open carry.´).
213. This is Eugene Volokh¶s quote made while advancing an argument that seems to support this proposition.
See Volokh, supra note 177, at 1524.
214. Symposium, supra note 175, at 432.
215. Id.
216. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008); see also Wrenn v. District of Columbia,
864 F.3d 650, 658 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (³Under Heller I’s treatment of these and earlier cases and commentaries,
history matters . . . ´).
217. Volokh, supra note 177, at 1522.
218. Cf. Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment and the Inalienable Right to Self-Defense, HERITAGE (Apr. 17,
2014) (stating that Heller’s non-exclusive list of presumptively lawful regulations included a ban on concealed
carry, thus arguably implying that the only public-carry option left available by Heller was open-carry),
http://www.heritage.org/the-constitution/report/the-second-amendment-and-the-inalienable-right-self-defense.
219. Telephone Interview with Nelson Lund, Professor, George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School,
(Nov. 30, 2018).
220. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626; Lund, supra note 20, at 10 (noting that Heller appeared to approve of
concealed carry restrictions).
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FDUU\ DQ\ ZHDSRQ ZKDWVRHYHU LQ DQ\ PDQQHU ZKDWVRHYHU´221 the specific illustration
Heller used to demonstrate its point is telling. The Supreme Court RSLQHG³>I@RUH[DPSOH
the majority of 19th-century courts . . . held that prohibitions on carrying concealed
ZHDSRQV ZHUH ODZIXO XQGHU WKH 6HFRQG $PHQGPHQW RU VWDWH DQDORJXHV´ 222 If this
language means that Heller favored (or at least did not overtly disfavor) concealed-carry
bans,223 and further, if it was Young¶V aim to ensure the protection of some form of publiccarry, then the previous argument of this Note fails. Under such circumstances, the Ninth
&LUFXLW¶V only option was to place open-carry at the core because Hawaii had every right,
under Heller, to ban concealed-carry.224
On the other hand, maybe Heller did not intend to convey approval of concealedcarry bans.225 Perhaps, the Supreme Court was simply using historical bans on concealedcarry to illustrate a larger point that Second Amendment rights are not unlimited.226
Consider carefully Heller¶V direct discussion of historical concealed-carry restrictions:
Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. From
Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained
that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner
whatsoever and for whatever purpose. For example, the majority of the 19th-century courts
to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful
under the Second Amendment or state analogues. (citations omitted). Although we do not
undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second
Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding
the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. 227

7KH SUHFLVH VHTXHQFH RI WKH &RXUW¶V GLVFXVVLRQ LV QRWHZRUWK\ 228 First, the Court
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221. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
222. Id.
223. See Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2013) (supporting the view that Heller¶s
language excluded concealed carry rights from Second Amendment protection); Heller v. District of Columbia,
670 F.3d 1244, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (supporting the view that concealed-carry
regulations are permissible under Heller); Jonathan Lowy & Kelly Sampson, Right Not to Be Shot: Public Safety,
Private Guns, and the Constellation of Constitutional Liberties, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL¶Y 187, 189 (2016);
Meltzer, supra note 173, at 1486; Lund, supra note 218.
224. See Lowy & Sampson, supra note 223, at 189; Lund, supra note 218.
225. See Megan Ruebsamen, The Gun-Shy Commonwealth: Self-Defense and Concealed Carry in Post-Heller
Massachusetts, 18 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 55, 76 (2013) (referencing Heller and stating ³[t]he
Supreme Court did not examine the constitutionality of statutes restricting the right of law-abiding citizens to
carry concealed weapons for use in self-defense, but their lack of examination does not mean laws restricting
conceal and carry are presumptively valid´); Jeff Golimowski, Pulling the Trigger: Evaluating Criminal Gun
Laws in a Post-Heller World, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1599, 1608 n.85 (2012) (noting that although concealedcarry restrictions were discussed in Heller, they were not included in ³Heller’s laundry list´ of presumptively
lawful prohibitions); Lund supra note 20, at 10 (noting that although Heller appeared to approve of concealed
carry restrictions, the Court stopped short of expressly doing so) (emphasis added).
226. See Golimowski, supra note 225, at 1608 n.85.
227. 554 U.S. 570, 626±27 (2008) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
228. The argument advanced in this Note regarding the possible significance of the Court¶s sequence of
discussion regarding concealed-carry was developed after noting Jeff Golimowski¶s observation in n.85. See
Golimowski, supra note 225, at 1608 n.85.
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acknowledged the existence of nineteenth-century concealed-carry restrictions.229 The
Court then seemed to pause and interject its unwillingness to undertake a full analysis of
the scope of the Second Amendment.230 And then, only after declining to conduct a full
scope analysis, the Court expressly listed several types of Second Amendment regulations
its holding was not intended to disturb.231 Strikingly absent from this list was any
suggestion that Heller favored concealed-carry prohibitions.232 Although Heller’s list of
lawful prohibitions was not exhaustive, 233 it is reasonable to conclude that if the Supreme
Court had intended to support concealed-carry restrictions, it would have made that intent
apparent by including concealed-carry bans on its list of acceptable Second Amendment
limitations.
3HUKDSV WKH &RXUW¶V XQZLOOLQJQHVV WR FRQGXFW D IXOO 6HFRQG $PHQGPHQW VFRSH
analysis was intended to be a signal that if the Court had chosen to conduct a scope
analysis, it would have determined that concealed-FDUU\ EDQV ZHUH QRW ³SUHVXPSWLYHO\
ODZIXO´234 If this proposal is sound, then Young’s placement of open-carry within the core
was unnecessary. A better alternative would have been for the Ninth Circuit simply to
follow Wrenn and place public-carry at the core, then allow Hawaii to decide which
manner(s) of public-carry it preferred to make available to its citizens.235
V. WHAT IS A CORE IN THE FIRST PLACE? A MORE CONCRETE DEFINITION
MAY HAVE CAUSED A DIFFERENT OUTCOME IN YOUNG
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229. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626; see also Golimowski, supra note 225, at 1608 n.85.
230. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626; see also Golimowski, supra note 225, at 1608 n.85.
231. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626±27; see also Golimowski, supra note 225, at 1608 n.85.
232. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626±27; see also Golimowski, supra note 225, at 1608 n.85.
233. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626±27 n.26.
234. Id.
235. This is known as the alternative outlet theory which has been discussed in case law and scholarly writing.
The theory stands for the proposition that one method of carry may be banned or restricted so long as the other
method is permitted. See Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 662 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (³The rights to keep
and to bear, to possess and to carry, are equally important inasmuch as regulations on each must leave alternative
channels for both.´); see also Meltzer, supra note 173, at 1525±28; James Bishop, Hidden or on the Hip: The
Right(s) to Carry After Heller, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 917±21 (2012).
236. See generally Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012); Kachalsky v. County of
Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013); Woollard v.
Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013); Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016); Wrenn,
864 F.3d 650; Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2018); Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659 (1st Cir. 2018).
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Perhaps, in order to determine whether an individual public-carry right is properly
placed at the core of the Second Amendment, it is necessary to first address a more
fundamental question: what exactly does it mean for the Second Amendment to have a
core? Importantly, this question does not ask what the core of the Amendment is; rather,
it asks what a core is in the first place. One must accept here, as a practical matter, that a
right cannot be accurately positioned in relation to the core unless there is a concrete
understanding of what a core is. A review of circuit-level public-carry case law reveals no
firm definition of a core within the context of the Second Amendment.236
Notably, the judicial focus on the core appears to be growing alongside the temporal
distance from Heller. In HellerWKHZRUG³FRUH´ZDVRQO\XVHGWKUHHWLPHVLQWKHHQWLUHW\
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of the opinion.237 On the other hand, in the recent cases of Wrenn, Young, and Gould²all
of which use Heller as their primary guide²WKRVHPDMRULWLHVXVHGWKHZRUG³FRUH´WZHQW\seven times, twenty-five times, and nineteen times respectively. 238
A. A Proposed Definition of the Core
Relying on language and inferences from Heller D ³FRUH´ JXDUDQWHH ZLWKLQ WKH
FRQWH[WRIWKH6HFRQG$PHQGPHQWLVSURSHUO\GHILQHGDQGXQGHUVWRRGDVWKH$PHQGPHQW¶V
³SULPDU\SXUSRVH´)URPDVLPSOHFRQWHQWVWDQGSRLQWWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWRSLQLRQVRQWKH
matter appear to support this proposition. While Heller used the word core only three
times, the majority alone used the word purpose thirty-five times.239 Moreover, when the
Supreme Court did use the word core, it was commonly in conjunction with the word
purpose. For example, in McDonald, the Court nRWHGWKDW³FLWL]HQVPXVWEHSHUPLWWHGµWR
use [handguns] for the core lawful purpose of self-defense.¶´240 The same interplay was
also present in Heller$IWHUH[DPLQLQJDUHTXLUHPHQWWKDWDOOKDQGJXQVLQDQLQGLYLGXDO¶V
home must be kept inoperable, the Heller &RXUWFRQFOXGHGWKDWVXFKDUHVWULFWLRQ³PD>GH@
it impossible for citizens to use [handguns] for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and
>ZD@VKHQFHXQFRQVWLWXWLRQDO´241 If this proposed substitution of terms were accepted, it
would cause an examining court to substitute the phrase primary purpose every time it
intended to use the word core.
Substituting the phrase primary purpose for the word core and applying it to Heller
renders the reasonable conclusion that the primary purpose of the Second Amendment is
to guarantee an individual right of self-defense.242 Prior to Young, the split among the
circuits was limited to a lack of agreement over the extent of the primary purpose.
Specifically, was the primary purpose of the Amendment to guarantee a right of selfdefense wherever such need arose, or was it only to guarantee a self-defense right within
the home? This is a legitimate question which Heller left unanswered²hence the split.

Young essentially concluded that the primary purpose of the Second Amendment is
to secure an individual right to self-defense wherever such need arises, but only by way of
open-carry.243 But if core actually means primary purpose, Young’s conclusion does not
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237. Heller, 554 U.S. at 630, 634, 720.
238. Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 657±59, 661, 664±67; Young, 896 F.3d at 1052, 1068±71; Gould, 907 F.3d at 667,
670±72, 674.
239. Heller, 554 U.S. at 577±78, 584, 588±90, 595, 599±600, 602, 608, 612±13, 617±18, 620, 625±26, 628±
31, 635.
240. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 768 (2010) (emphasis added).
241. Heller, 554 U.S. at 630 (emphasis added); see also Zuidema, supra note 15, at 826 (³Heller identified the
core of the Second Amendment as the right to keep firearms for the µlawful purpose of self-defense,¶ while the
periphery consists of the right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes other than self-defense, such as hunting
or recreation.´).
242. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 592 (³[W]e find [the textual elements of the Second Amendment] guarantee the
individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation. . . . The very text of the Second
Amendment implicitly recognizes the pre-existence of the right and declares only that it µshall not be
infringed.¶´).
243. Cf. Young, 896 F.3d at 1070.
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add up because a person can defend herself regardless of whether she carries her firearm
openly or concealed. Stated plainly, the manner of carry (concealed versus open) has no
relationship to the primary purpose of self-defense. Since the Second AmendmenW¶V
primary purpose can be carried out by either manner of carry, it was inappropriate for the
Ninth Circuit to elevate one manner to the core and exclude the other.
The reason for excluding such matters from the core guarantee is apparent given the
previously discussed notion that statutes which infringe on the core will be subjected to a
heightened level of scrutiny.244 By placing open-carry within the core of the Second
$PHQGPHQWWKH1LQWK&LUFXLWVHHPLQJO\IRUHFORVHG+DZDLL¶VRSWLRQWROLPLWRSHQ-carry
in favor of concealed-carry. This is a faulty result. Although some lower courts have
observed Heller and McDonald’s apparent support for the idea that the right to self-defense
exists wherever the need arises,245 individual states should have latitude to choose whether
they want to allow both methods of public-carry or prefer to restrict or even ban one in
favor of the other.246
VI. GIVEN THE DISAGREEMENT OVER THE SECOND $0(1'0(17¶6 CORE
AND $0(5,&$¶6 STATUS AS A MASS-SHOOTING SOCIETY, SUPREME
COURT INTERVENTION IS NECESSARY
*LYHQWKHVKLIWLQJDQGPDOOHDEOHQDWXUHRIWKH6HFRQG$PHQGPHQW¶VFRUH6XSUHPH
Court resolution of the circuit dispute is both necessary and appropriate. While it is
dangerous to speculate whether the highest Court would place a right to public-carry
within the core, it is undeniable that the public safety implications of its decision could be
profound. 2019 America is arguably a mass-shooting society.247 Within a recent twelve-
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244. E.g., Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting U.S. v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d
458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011)) (³[W]e assume that any law that would burden the µfundamental,¶ core right of selfdefense in the home by a law-abiding citizen would be subject to strict scrutiny. But, as we move outside the
home, firearm rights have always been more limited, because public safety interests often outweigh individual
interests in self-defense.´); Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 670±71 (1st Cir. 2018) (³In our judgment, the
appropriate level of scrutiny must turn on how closely a particular law or policy approaches the core of the
Second Amendment right and how heavily it burdens that right. A law or policy that burdens conduct falling
within the core of the Second Amendment requires a correspondingly strict level of scrutiny, whereas a law or
policy that burdens conduct falling outside the core of the Second Amendment logically requires a less
demanding level of scrutiny.´); Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 93 (2d Cir. 2012) (³We do
not believe however, that heightened scrutiny must always be akin to strict scrutiny when a law burdens the
Second Amendment. . . . Although we have no occasion to decide what level of scrutiny should apply to laws
that burden the µcore¶ Second Amendment protection identified in Heller, we believe that applying less than strict
scrutiny when the regulation does not burden the µcore¶ protection of self-defense in the home makes eminent
sense . . . ´); see also Zuidema, supra note 15, at 826 (³Most courts have determined that the core is afforded
more protection than rights falling within the amendment¶s periphery.´).
245. See Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 657±58 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Young, 896 F.3d at 1070
(citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 599; McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 787 (2010)).
246. The conclusion that ³core´ is properly defined as ³primary purpose´ supports the alternative outlet theory
mentioned in note 235. The theory has been discussed in case law and scholarly writings. The theory stands for
the proposition that one method of carry may be banned or restricted so long as the other is allowed. See Wrenn,
864 F.3d 650 at 662±63 (³The rights to keep and to bear, to possess and to carry, are equally important inasmuch
as regulations on each must leave alternative channels for both.´); see also Meltzer, supra note 173, at 1525±28;
Bishop, supra note 235, at 917±21.
247. See Susan Miller & Kevin McCoy, Thousand Oaks makes 307 mass shootings in 311 days, USA TODAY
(Nov. 8, 2018, 10:29 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2018/11/08/thousand-oaks-californiabar-shooting-307th-mass-shooting/1928574002/ (stating that in the 311 days of 2018 up to the writing of the
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day span, twenty-three people were killed and nine more injured in two high-profile mass
shootings at a synagogue in Pittsburgh and a crowded bar in Thousand Oaks, California. 248
As senselessly tragic as the murders of twenty-three people are, it is equally appalling that
this nation has reached the point where certain mass shootings are high-profile²
necessarily implying that other mass shootings are not. 249
-RKQ+HQGULFNV¶VDFWLRQVDUHLQVWUXFWLYH:KHQ+HQGULFNVVKRW(YHUDUGR&XVWRGLR
Custodio was firing a gun into a group of pedestrians on the opposite side of the street.250
Under such circumstances, is it not reasonable to conclude that Hendricks prevented a
mass shooting? If it is reasonable, now take Hendricks and place him leaning against the
corner of a pool table at the Borderline Bar and Grill in Thousand Oaks, California, or
worshiping at the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh. Assuming he perceived the same
threat and took the same action he did in Chicago, those recent tragedies are possibly
prevented or, at least, rendered less catastrophic. 251
It is necessary to recognize that individuals calling for greater control and those
seeking expanded gun rights, while taking diametrically opposed positions, presumably
share the same end goal²increased public safety. Arguably, a shortcoming of the gun
control argument is a failure to recognize the reality of Heller¶V effect. While the belief
that Heller was wrongly decided is fair, it is also irrelevant. Heller, at a minimum,
guarantees the right to possess and use handguns for self-defense in the home.252 As a
result, handguns are plentiful in America, and Heller takes no issue with that.253 Given
this, it is questionable whether restrictions on the right to carry handguns in public for selfdefense would have a positive impact on public safety, 254 especially within the sphere of
mass shootings. It seems a somewhat tenuous argument to claim that criminalizing publiccarry by law-abiding citizens will dissuade a mass-shooter from carrying out his
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article, 307 mass shootings had occurred).
248. Shelly Bradbury, Tree of Life Survivor Released from Hospital After Mass Shooting, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE (Nov. 7, 2018, 9:49 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/local/city/2018/11/07/Tree-of-Life-survivorreleased-from-hospital-Andrea-Wedner/stories/201811070114 (providing updated information on the mass
shooting that occurred on October 27, 2018); Katie Zezima, Mark Berman, Lindsey Bever & Isaac StanleyBecker, 12 People Killed, Including Sheriff’s Deputy in ‘Horrific’ California Bar Shooting, WASH. POST (Nov.
8, 2018, 6:03 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/11/08/multiple-injuries-reported-barshooting-thousand-oaks-calif/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.5fb1dd7424f2; Mass Shootings in 2018, GUN
VIOLENCE ARCHIVE (last visited Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.gunviolencearchive.org/reports/mass-shooting.
249. Cf. Miller & McCoy, supra note 247 (stating that in the 311 days of 2018 up to the writing of the article,
307 mass shootings had occurred).
250. See, e.g., Bates, supra note 1; Ziezulewicz, supra note 1.
251. Cf. Bates, supra note 1; Fedschun, supra note 11; McCausland, supra note 11. But see Violence Policy
Center: Concealed Carry Killers, CONCEALED CARRY KILLERS, http://concealedcarrykillers.org/ (last updated
Jan. 17, 2019).
252. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628±30 (2008).
253. Id. at 636 (³We are aware of the problem of handgun violence in this country, and we take seriously the
concerns raised by the many amici who believe the prohibition of handgun ownership is a solution. . . . But the
enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table. These include the
absolute prohibition of handguns held and used for self-defense in the home.´); Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d
933, 939 (7th Cir. 2012) (³Anyway the Supreme Court made clear in Heller that it wasn¶t going to make a right
to bear arms depend on casualty counts. If the mere possibility that allowing guns to be carried in public would
increase crime or death rates sufficed to justify a ban, Heller would have been decided the other way . . . ´).
254. See Lott, supra note 8, at 1212±13 (2012). But see WEBSTER, supra note 8, at 6±7.
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carnage.255 An extension of Heller WRLQFOXGHDVSDUWRIWKH6HFRQG$PHQGPHQW¶V core
guarantee, the right to carry handguns beyond the home for self-defense might reduce the
mass-shooting casualty count.
VII. CONCLUSION
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255. See Lott Jr., supra note 8, at 1212±13. But see WEBSTER, supra note 8, at 6±7.
256. See Ireland, supra note 209, at 370±72; Volokh, supra note 177, at 1523±24; Symposium, supra note
175, at 432 (proposing that in today¶s society openly displaying a firearm is considered provocative and very
aggressive).
257. Cf. Lund, supra note 218 (³Heller . . . set[s] forth a non-exclusive list of µpresumptively lawful¶
regulations that include . . . bans on the concealed carry of firearms . . . ´).
258. See Ruebsamen, supra note 225, at 76±77 (referencing Heller and stating, ³[t]he Supreme Court did not
examine the constitutionality of statutes restricting the right of law-abiding citizens to carry concealed weapons
for use in self-defense, but their lack of examination does not mean laws restricting conceal and carry are
presumptively valid´); Golimowski, supra note 225, at 1608 n.85 (noting that although concealed-carry
restrictions were discussed in Heller, they were not included in ³Heller¶s laundry list´ of presumptively lawful
prohibitions); Lund, supra note 20, at 10 (noting that although Heller appeared to approve of concealed carry
restrictions, the Court stopped short of expressly doing so).
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Despite the well-IRXQGHGDUJXPHQWWKDWWKHQDWLRQ¶VIUDPHUVLQWHQGHGWKH6HFRQG
Amendment to apply only to the preservation and maintenance of state militias, Heller
confidently pronounced that the Amendment secures an individual right to self-defense
that is preserved even in the absence of any militia connection. But, how far does this right
extend? Is it limited to the home or does it also exist in public? As evidenced by the current
circuit split, HelleU¶s holding has spawned confusion and disagreement over the scope of
WKH6HFRQG$PHQGPHQW¶VJXDUDQWHH:KLOHWKHUHLVDJHQHUDOFRQVHQVXVWKDWWKH6HFRQG
Amendment must have some application in public, the tension among the circuits appears
to be narrowly focused on whether public-carry does or does not lie within the
$PHQGPHQW¶VFRUH$OWKRXJKHeller provides fodder for both views, the more compelling
argument, advanced in Wrenn and arguably²although not decisively²in Young, is that
public-FDUU\LVLQFOXGHGLQWKH$PHQGPHQW¶VFRUHJXDUDQWHH$VVXFKJRRG-cause statutes
that restrict the public-carry rights of law-abiding citizens should be deemed
unconstitutional.
Despite Young¶V apparent concurrence with Wrenn on the determination that publicFDUU\LVSDUWRIWKH$PHQGPHQW¶VFRUHWKH1LQWK&LUFXLW¶VQXDQFHGFRQFOXVLRQWKDWRSHQcarry is the only form of public-carry within the core, disconnects it from modern
sensibilities.256 While an argument can be made that placing open-carry at the core was
the only option Heller left available to the Young court if its aim was to place some form
of public-carry within the core,257 there is a counter-argument that Heller did not intend
to endorse concealed-carry restrictions.258
If the core of the Second Amendment is accurately defined as the primary purpose
of the Amendment, then it was inappropriate for the Ninth Circuit to place a specific
manner of public-carry within the core because thH$PHQGPHQW¶VSULPDU\SXUSRVH²selfdefense²can be exercised regardless of whether a handgun is carried openly or concealed.
*LYHQWKHGLVDJUHHPHQWRYHUWKHVFRSHRIWKH6HFRQG$PHQGPHQW¶VFRUH6XSUHPH&RXUW
intervention is necessary to decisively determine the level of constitutional protection
public-carry should be afforded. A ruling in either direction could have significant public
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